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ARTICLES 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EU 
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO 
ABORTION:  ROE V. WADE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE 
ATLANTIC? 
Federico Fabbrini * 
This Article analyzes the legal regulation of abortion 
within the context of Europe’s multilevel system for the 
protection of fundamental rights.  The Article examines 
the constitutional dynamics and challenges that emerge 
in the field of abortion law from the overlap between 
national and supranational norms in Europe, 
comparing the European multilevel architecture with 
the United States (U.S.) federal system.  To this end, the 
Article summarizes the main trends in the regulation of 
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abortion in the various European Union (“EU”) 
countries, assesses the growing impact of the EU and 
the European Convention on Human Rights in the field
of abortion law, and emphasizes how supranational 
law generates new pressures and creates several 
inconsistencies within the domestic legal systems of 
those states which restrict abortion rights.  It then 
explores how analogous dynamics have historically 
been at play in the U.S. federal system.  Finally, the 
Article evaluates—in light of the U.S. experience—the 
potential consequences upon the European abortion 
regime of the most recent developments in the 
European Court of Human Rights case law and the 
entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights via the Lisbon reform Treaty. 
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Abortion laws in Europe and the United States (U.S.) have 
increasingly converged throughout the last thirty years.  In the early 
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1980s, the refrain among many comparative lawyers wa  that, among 
Western countries, the U.S. stood alone in recognizing a broad 
individual right to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.  
Conversely, most European states subjected abortion to stricter 
regulations or prohibited ittout court.1 Already during the mid-1990s, 
however, scholars emphasized that the U.S. was retreating from its 
earlier, very liberal position, by permitting states to restrict a woman’s 
right to an abortion.2   Simultaneously, European countries were 
widening the conditions under which women could choose whether to 
terminate their pregnancies, often under the pressu of the rising 
supranational laws.3 
An assessment of the abortion laws on each side of the Atlantic at 
the end of the 2010s highlights an even clearer pattern of convergence.  
In the U.S., the federal government4 and many state legislatures have 
enacted laws that further constrain a woman’s access to an abortion.5 
These measures have gradually pushed back the time period during 
which a woman can obtain an abortion, from the end of her second 
trimester to somewhere closer to the end of her first t imester.6 
Moreover, a bill enacted in March 2011 by the state of South Dakota7 
 
 1 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 10–
50 (1987).  See also Marie-Thérèse Meulders-Klein, Vie privée, vie familiale et 
droits de l’homme, 44 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 767, 767 (1992). 
 2 See LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 197 (1990); 
MARK TUSHNET, ABORTION: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 115 (1996). 
 3 See David Cole, “Going to England”:  Irish Abortion Law and the 
European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT’L &  COMP. L. REV. 113, 114–15 (1994); 
Rick Lawson, The Irish Abortion Cases: European Limits to National Sovereignty?, 
1 EUR. J. OF HEALTH LAW 167, 167–83 (1994). 
 4 See infra text accompanying notes 289–94. 
 5 See Eric Eckholm, Across Country, Lawmakers Push Abortion Curbs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at A1. 
 6 See David Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v Carhart and the Future of 
Abortion Law, SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46 (2008) (arguing that in the long run “the 
hypothesis that federal constitutional protection [f abortion] will eventually recede 
toward an end-of-the-first-trimester benchmark, after which any legal abortion will 
require case-by-case medical review and approval, remains the historical best guess 
as to how the controversy will reach stasis”). 
 7 See H.B. 1217, 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011) (“An Act to establish certain 
legislative findings pertaining to the decision of a pregnant mother considering 
termination of her relationship with her child by an bortion, to establish certain 
procedures to better insure that such decisions are voluntary, uncoerced, and 
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has introduced a system of mandatory counseling for the first time in 
the U.S., which is not dissimilar from that in effect in several 
European states.  The bill states that women seeking abortions in 
South Dakota must first participate in a directed consultation at a pro-
life pregnancy center.8 
Meanwhile, a number of Member States in the European Union 
(“EU”) have liberalized their abortion legislations over the last few 
years.9  In addition, the strictest abortion bans have come under the 
scrutiny of the European supranational courts.  In a landmark ruling, 
A., B. & C. v. Ireland,10 decided in December 2010, the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) found that Ireland, the country in 
the EU with perhaps the most restrictive prohibition on abortion,11 had 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) by 
failing to provide accessible and effective procedural mechanisms by 
which a woman could establish her fundamental right to a lawful 
abortion when her life was in peril due to her pregnancy.12  The ruling 
generated widespread public reaction,13 and the resulting dialogue on 
the most appropriate way of complying with the ECtHR’s decision 
played a major role in the ensuing Irish electoral debate.14  
 
informed, and to revise certain causes of action for pr fessional negligence relating 
to performance of an abortion”). 
 8 See A.G. Sulzberger, Women Seeking Abortions in South Dakota to Get 
Anti-Abortion Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, at A16 (arguing that the law 
enacted on March 22, 2011 in South Dakota “makes th state the first [in the U.S.] to 
require women who are seeking abortions to first attend a consultation”). 
 9 See infra text accompanying notes 25–39. 
 10 A., B. & C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 203 , 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 102–113. 
 12  See Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Counc. Eur., Nov. 11, 1950, CETS No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]; see also 
Carl O’Brien & Harry McGee, Irish Abortion Laws Breach Human Rights, Court 
Rules, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010. 
 13 See Aoife Carr, Anti Abortion Group Calls for Referendum, IRISH TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2010; Kitty Holland, Judgment ‘A Landmark for Irish Women,’ IRISH 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010. 
 14 See Paul Cullen & Carl O’Brien, Abortion Becomes Election Issue After 
Court Ruling, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010.  As the February 25, 2011, election date 
neared, the debate about the economy and the grave crisis that had hit Ireland took 
the front lines.  The issue of abortion and how to implement the ECtHR ruling was 
addressed in the manifestos of all political parties and was soon tackled by the new 
government.  On June 16, 2011, the Department of Health released an action plan for 
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The purpose of this Article is to compare the constitutional 
dynamics at play in the field of abortion law in the U.S. federal and 
European multilevel constitutional systems.  Other wo ks already deal 
with the similarities and differences between the U.S. and European 
approaches to the complex questions raised by abortion.15  These 
scholarly assessments, however, usually compare European countries 
individually with the U.S.  When these assessments consider the 
jurisprudence of supranational jurisdictions (such as the ECtHR or the 
EU Court of Justice (ECJ)), it is mainly to better explain the internal 
legal framework of a specific European state. 
In this Article, I plan to take into account the European system as a 
whole.  The European system, in fact, can be described as a multilevel 
constitutional architecture in which national, supranational (EU) and 
international (ECHR) laws intertwine.16  The pluralist nature of the 
European constitutional architecture is particularly evident in the field 
of fundamental rights.  Each of the three layers comprising the 
European structure is endowed with norms and institutions for the 
protection of human rights that overlap and interact with one 
another.17  The dominant perception among European constitutional 
lawyers is that the European multilevel system is a sui generis 
 
the implementation of the judgment.  In this plan,  the Government inter alia 
committed to establish an Expert Group by November 2011, which would be 
charged with making recommendations on how to properly address the matter.  Press 
Release, Dep’t of Health, Action Plan Regarding A., B. and C. v. Ireland (Dec. 16, 
2010), available at http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2011/20110616.html?lang=en. 
 15 For a comparison of abortion law and politics in the U.S. and a selected 
number of European countries, see MAURO CAPPELLETTI &  WILLIAM COHEN, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1979); VICKI C. JACKSON &  MARK TUSHNET, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 1–140 (1999); Machteld Nijsten, Abortion 
and Constitutional Law:  A Comparative European-American Study (unpublished 
Ph.D. 1990). 
 16 On the concept of multi-level constitutionalism, see the works of Ingolf 
Pernice: Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam, 36 COMMON 
MARKET L. REV. 703 (1999); Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, 
27 EUROPEAN L. REV. 511 (2002); The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel 
Constitutionalism in Action, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349 (2009). 
 17 On the pluralist European architecture for the protection of fundamental 
rights, see Miguel Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual Law:  Europe’s Constitutional 
Pluralism in Action, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 501 (Neil Walker ed., 2003); 
Marta Cartabia, Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously, 5 EUROPEAN 
CONST. L. REV. 5 (2009); AIDA TORRES PÉREZ, CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION:  A  THEORY OF SUPRANATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2009). 
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architecture.  However, as I have argued elsewhere,18 the European 
constitutional system for the protection of fundamental rights can be 
meaningfully compared with other federal arrangements and can be 
better understood when compared as such. 
Therefore, this Article analyzes the ways in which the complex 
interactions among national and transnational norms and institutions in 
Europe affect abortion law by comparing the European multilevel 
architecture to the U.S. federal system.  In particular, the Article 
claims that, whereas several differences exist in the regulation of 
abortion among the EU Member States, the growing impact of EU and 
ECHR law has generated new pressures and challenges i  the 
domestic legal systems that restrict abortion.  Consequently, a number 
of tensions and inconsistencies currently characterize the European 
abortion regime.  As the comparative assessment of the U.S. 
constitutional experience emphasizes, however, analogous 
constitutional dynamics have also been at play in the U.S. system 
because of the interplay between state and federal rules. 
Abortion regulations among the states have varied gr atly in the 
U.S.  Since the 1970s, the federal judiciary has recognized that the 
U.S. Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose whether to 
terminate her pregnancy.  This recognition established a more 
consistent framework for the protection of abortion.  At the same time, 
no uniform, federal abortion law exists in the U.S. because the states 
are relatively autonomous in regulating pregnancy and other family 
law issues.  Using the U.S. experience as a comparative tool, this 
Article examines whether a similar development is foreseeable in 
Europe, with the recognition of a transnational mini um standard for 
the protection of abortion rights, which can be integrated or 
superseded, but not lowered by domestic rules.  Hence, the Article 
considers the recent decision of the ECtHR in the case A., B. & C. v. 
Ireland, as well as the potential impact of the entry into force of the 
EU Lisbon Treaty and its binding Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
In comparing the peculiar dynamics that characterize the 
regulation and protection of abortion rights in plura ist, heterarchical 
constitutional arrangements like the European multilevel architecture 
 
 18 Federico Fabbrini, The European Multilevel System of Fundamental Rights 
Protection: A ‘Neo-Federalist’ Perspective, JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER No. 15 
(2010), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/10/101501.pdf. 
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and the U.S. federal system, this Article’s aim is primarily analytical.19  
My goal is to underline, from a descriptive point of view, how 
comparable constitutional challenges arise from the two systems, 
rather than to advocate, from a prescriptive point of view, the 
migration of constitutional solutions from one system to the other.20  
The U.S. example is used as a mirror to better appreciate the 
complexities and tensions that are at play in the European framework 
of abortion laws—not as a model that should be imported into the 
European context. 
The Article proceeds as follows  Section 1 summarizes EU 
Member States’ abortion laws.  Section 2 describes the growing 
influence that the EU and the ECHR exercise upon domestic abortion 
laws and highlights the challenges and tensions that emerge from this 
overlap.  Section 3 argues that these inconsistencies are neither unique 
nor exceptional and explains how comparable dynamics have also 
been at play in the U.S. federal system.  Section 4 a alyzes the recent 
decision of the ECtHR in A., B. & C. v. Ireland and evaluates its 
implication for the protection of abortion rights in Europe.  Finally, 
Section 5 assesses the impact of the entry into force f the Lisbon 
Treaty and discusses the potential role of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the review of domestic abortion laws. 
Before getting started, I believe a final warning is in order:  I am 
aware that when dealing with a controversial topic su h as abortion, it 
is difficult for an author to resist the influence of his or her personal 
conceptions regarding the serious moral questions at the core of 
abortion issues.  From this point of view, the very fact that I formulate 
the issue as a “woman’s right to an abortion” will reveal my 
inclination towards a more liberal position, which supports the 
 
 19 On the concept of constitutional heterarchy as the descriptive model of both 
the U.S. and the EU constitutional arrangements, see Daniel Halberstam, 
Constitutional Heterarchy:  The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and 
the United States, in RULING THE WORLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 326 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009). 
 20 On the potential of comparative constitutional lawin fostering the 
migration of constitutional models and ideas, see Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a 
New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 13–16 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
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protection of abortion21—a position with which pro-life advocates 
would certainly disagree.  Having revealed my subjectiv  viewpoint 
on the moral issue presented, I have sought to adopt, throughout my 
assessment, an analytical stance, which will use a comparative 
methodology to explore the complex constitutional phenomena 
characterizing the European abortion regime for what t ey are, rather 
than for what they should be. 
In the concluding part of the Article, however, I will abandon 
analytical neutrality and advance what is a normative argument in 
favor of greater protection for abortion rights at the supranational level 
in Europe.  In a nutshell, I will emphasize how theexistence in some 
EU states of strict criminal bans on abortion, coupled with the 
possibility for pregnant women to escape the prohibition by travelling 
to another EU state where abortion is permitted, has discriminatory 
effects upon well-off and low-income women, raising serious 
questions of equality.  In discussing the future alt rnative scenarios for 
the European abortion regime, therefore, I will suggest that the 
creation of a system of soft pluralism, with stricter review of domestic 
abortion laws to ensure their conformity with transnational human 
rights standards, is an advisable option in the EU. 
II.  STATES’ ABORTION LAWS 
Abortion law in Europe is quite diversified.22  A plurality of the 
EU Member States recognizes, in a more or less liberal fashion, a 
right—based mostly on statutory law—for a pregnant woman to have 
an abortion within a certain number of weeks from the inception of 
pregnancy.  In several states, however, abortion is not regarded as a 
woman’s right; rather, it is only permitted under ctain conditions and 
 
 21 For a classical liberal argument in favour of a woman’s right to choose 
whether to seek an abortion, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN 
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1994). 
 22 For an overview of abortion regulation in the EU Member States, see 
generally Caroline Forder, Abortion:  A Constitutional Problem in European 
Perspective, 1 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &  COMP. L. 56 (1994); ALBIN ESER &  HANS-
GEORG KOCH, ABORTION AND THE LAW:  FROM INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON TO 
LEGAL POLICY (2005).  For a summary of abortion legislation in Europe in 2009, see 
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), ABORTION LEGISLATION IN 
EUROPE, INTERNATIONAL PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION (2009), available at  
http://www.ippfen.org/en/Resources/Publications/Abortion+Legislation+in+Europe.
htm. 
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pursuant to specific procedures, which often include mandated 
medical advice and counseling sessions.  In addition, some EU 
Member States still have extremely restrictive abortion laws, which 
criminalize all forms of abortion, except when deemd necessary to 
save the life or protect the health of the pregnant woman from severe 
injury. 
Criminal bans on abortions appeared in the statute books of 
European states during the nineteenth century, originally to protect the 
life of women because, because medical techniques for abortion were 
then not considered sufficiently reliable to prevent dangering the 
health of the women.23 Over time, however, these measures began to 
serve the purpose of safeguarding a traditional concept of the family 
and morals.24 This view largely survived the enactment of post-World 
War II liberal Constitutions.  Since the 1960s, however, social and 
political pressures to reform criminal bans on abortion began to rise in 
many countries of Western Europe.25  Starting with the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), which legalized abortion in 1967,26  measures 
legalizing or decriminalizing abortion were successfully enacted in a 
few years in Scandinavia, Austria,27  France,28  West Germany,29 
Italy,30 and the Netherlands.31  
A second wave of reforms then took place between th late 1980s 
and 1990s in Belgium,32 and—after the transition to democracy—in 
Greece33  and Spain.34   The collapse of the Soviet block, where 
 
 23 See ESER &  KOCH, supra note 22, at 19 
 24 Id. at 31. 
 25See Rebecca Cook & Bernard Dickens, Human Rights Dynamics of 
Abortion Law Reform, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 3, 4–7 (2003). 
 26 See infra text accompanying notes 45–54. 
 27 Cf. Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL], No. 60/1974,  von 23 (Austria). The Act, 
which amended the Strafgesetzbuch [Criminal Code] was upheld by the 
Verfassungsgerichthof in its decision of 11 October 1974, VfGH 7400 - JBL 1974.  
 28 See infra text accompanying notes 64–70. 
 29 See infra text accompanying notes 83–85. 
 30 See infra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
 31 Joyce Outshoorn, Policy-Making on Abortion: Arenas, Actors and 
Arguments in the Netherland, in ABORTION POLITICS 205, 206 (Dorothy McBride 
Stetson ed., 2003). 
 32 See Perrine Humblet et al., Developments in Abortion Policy in a Context of 
Illegality: The Belgian Case from 1971 until 1990, 6 EUR. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 288 
(1995). 
 33 See Nomos (1978: 821) (Greece) 
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abortion was already lawful, also prompted some of the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to enact legislation re-
affirming the legality of abortion.35  In the aftermath of unification, 
Germany revised its abortion legislation, harmonizing the (more 
restrictive) Western and (more liberal) Eastern German abortion 
laws.36  In the last decade, liberal abortion legislation has been adopted 
in Portugal37 and new, more permissive, abortion acts have been 
passed in France38 and Spain.39 
Nevertheless, although there is a general trend toward the gradual 
liberalization of abortion laws in Europe, opposing pressures exist and 
merit attention.40 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ireland tightened 
its anti-abortion regime by reinstating the strict nineteenth century 
criminal ban on abortion and amending the Constitution o enshrine 
the fundamental right to life of the unborn.41  Equally restrictive pulls 
emerged in some post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Especially in Poland where abortion on demand was widely 
available during the Communist regime, reforms in the 1990s resulted 
in backward movement, with a substantial prohibition of the voluntary 
termination of pregnancies.42  
Despite the differences existing among the various abortion laws 
in Europe, it is useful to classify the national legislations in four 
models.  Abortion is permitted in the first three legislative models:  
these models can be placed in a continuum from a more “liberal” to a 
more “restrictive” one, considering criteria such as the time-limitations 
during which a woman can have an abortion and the conditions and 
 
 34 See Belén Cambronero-Saiz et al., Abortion in Democratic Spain, 15 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 85, 86 (2007). 
 35 See Patrick Flood, Abortion and the Right to Life in Post-Communist 
Eastern Europe and Russia, 36 EAST EUROPEAN Q. 191 (2002). 
 36 Eva Maleck-Lewy, Between Self-Determination and State Supervision: 
Women and the Abortion Law in Post-Unification Germany, SOCIAL POLITICS 62 
(1995). 
 37 See infra text accompanying notes 71–73. 
 38 See infra text accompanying notes 67–70. 
 39 See infra text accompanying notes 74–80. 
 40 See ESER &  KOCH, supra note 22, at 18. 
 41 JAMES KINGSTON &  ANTHONY WHELAN, ABORTION AND THE LAW 4–5 
(1997). 
 42 See Andrzej Kulczycki, Abortion Policy in Postcommunist Europe: the 
Conflict in Poland, 21 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 471, 471–72 (1995). 
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procedures that define a woman’s right or ability to choose an 
abortion.43  A fourth, alternative, model of legislation is rep sented by 
those EU Member States that prohibit abortion t ut court, save in 
limited, exceptional circumstances.  In these system , the right to life 
of the unborn is regarded as paramount.  As a consequence, women 
are denied any right to choose whether to terminate their pregnancies. 
The U.K. has a fairly liberal legislative model of abortion.44  The 
Abortion Act 1967,45 as amended by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990,46  states that pregnancy can be lawfully 
terminated up to the 24th week if “the continuance of the pregnancy 
would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any 
existing children of her family.”47   In addition, abortion is always 
permitted if “the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman,”48 if 
“the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the 
pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated,”49 or 
if “there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer 
from such physical or mental abnormalities.”50 
 
 43 Cf. ESER &  KOCH, supra note 22, at 42 (arguing that the creation of basic 
regulatory models “is not dependent on one single diff rentiating criterion, but rather 
is based on a multi-factored approach”). 
 44 Note that the U.K. abortion legislation, however, applies in only Great 
Britain and not in Northern Ireland.  See Abortion Act 1967, 15 Eliz. 2, c. 87, § 7 
(Eng.). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 38 Eliz. 2, c. 37 (Eng.).  
 47 Abortion Act, § 1(1)(a), as amended by Human Fertilisa on and 
Embryology Act, § 37(1). (Prior to the enactment of he Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, Abortion Act 1967, § 1(1)(a), llowed abortion, without 
specifying limits, whenever “the termination of pregnancy would involve risk to the 
life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy 
was terminated.”  As such, the 1990 revisions have dis ntangled the original 1967 
provision, setting a limit at the end of the second trimester for abortion on ground of 
physical and mental “distress,” while allowing abortion with no limits in case of a 
serious risk to the life of or permanent injury to the health of the pregnant woman).    
 48 Id. § 1(1)(b). 
 49 Id. § 1(1)(c). 
 50 Id. § 1(1)(d). 
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The consent of two registered medical practitioners is required to 
perform an abortion,51  except when terminating the pregnancy is 
“immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.”52  
Nevertheless, in determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy 
would involve a risk of injury to the health of a woman, doctors may 
also consider “the pregnant woman’s actual or reason bly foreseeable 
environment.”53   As a consequence, women may obtain elective 
abortions for a wide variety of social reasons.54  Otherwise, the law 
neither sets counseling duties nor imposes waiting periods or parental / 
spousal consent / notification requirements. 
A different model of regulation of the right to aborti n is 
represented by the 1978 Italian legislation,55 shaped largely on the 
French Loi relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse of 
1975,56  which was, however, recently amended.57  Abortion is 
decriminalized and can lawfully be obtained in the first ninety days of 
pregnancy when “continuance of pregnancy, delivery or maternity 
would involve a serious risk for the physical and psychological health 
 
 51 Id. § 1(1). 
 52 Id. § 1(4). 
 53 Id. § 1(2). 
 54 See Christina Schlegel, Landmark in German Abortion Law: The German 
1995 Compromise Compared with English Law, 11 INT’L J. L. POL’ Y. &  THE FAMILY  
36, 51 (1997) (highlighting how “although according to the letter of the law and the 
intent of the legislator, there is no abortion on demand in England, in fact a woman 
seeking an abortion ‘only’ has to find two registered medical practitioners to certify 
the wide socio-medical grounds that justify abortion”). 
 55 Legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194, in G.U. May 22, 1978, n. 140 (It.).  In its 
decision of February 18, 1975 the Corte Costituzionale [Constitutional Court] had 
already declared unconstitutional the provision of the Italian Codice Penale 
[Criminal Code] punishing abortion to the extent to which it did not include an 
exception for a pregnant woman whose life was in peril.  See Racc. uff. corte cost. 
18 febbraio 1975, n. 27 (It.).  For an overview of the Italian abortion law, see 
generally Lucio Valerio Moscarini, Aborto. Profili costituzionali e disciplina 
legislativa, in 1 ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA TRECCANI (1988), ad vocem. 
 56 Loi 75–17 du 17 janvier 1975 relative à l’interruption volontaire de la 
grossesse [Law 75–17 of January 17, 1975, on the voluntary interruption of 
pregnancy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 18, 1975, p. 739.  The law was challenged before the 
Conseil Constitutionnel [Constitutional Court], which declared it constituional in its 
decision Conseil Constitutionnel decision No. 75–17DC, Jan 15, 1975 (Fr.). 
 57 See infra text accompanying notes 67–73. 
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[of the woman] in light of her state of health, or her economic, social 
and family conditions or the circumstances in which onception 
occurred or in view of the anomalies and malformations of the 
fetus.”58  After the first trimester, abortion is only permitted when 
there is a medically certified risk for the life of the pregnant woman or 
for her physical and psychological health.59 
Before obtaining an abortion in the first trimester, however, 
women are required to undergo compulsory non-directiv  counseling.  
Social assistants, family planning centers, or the woman’s physician 
must discuss together with the woman any possible alt rn tive 
solution to abortion and help her to overcome all the problems of a 
social nature that may push her to seek an abortion.60  If at the end of 
the counseling process a woman still wants an abortion, she has the 
right to receive a document certifying her pregnancy and her desire to 
terminate it.  After a waiting period of seven days, she can obtain an 
abortion in any hospital or authorized private clini . 61   Spousal 
notifications are suggested but not required by the law,62 and the 
requirement of parental consent for minor aged girls seeking an 
abortion can also be lifted thorough a judicial bypass.63 
France provided a similar regulation in 1975, allowing a woman to 
seek an abortion within the first ten weeks of pregnancy,64 after 
mandatory counseling,65 and a seven-day waiting period.66  In 2001, 
however, a new bill67 extended the possibility of seeking a termination 
 
 58 L. n. 194/1978, art. 4 (It.) (“la prosecuzione della gravidanza, il parto o la 
maternità comporterebbero un serio pericolo per la sua salute fisica o psichica [della 
donna], in relazione o al suo stato di salute, o alle sue condizioni economiche, o 
sociali o familiari, o alle circostanze in cui è avvenuto il concepimento, o a 
previsioni di anomalie o malformazioni del concepito.”).  
 59 Id. art. 6. 
 60 Id. art. 5. 
 61 Id. art. 5. 
 62 Id. art. 5. 
 63 Id. art. 12. 
 64 CODE DE LA SANTÉ [Health Code], art. 161–1, introduced by Loi 75–17 du 
17 janvier 1975 relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse [Law 75–17 of 
January 17, 1975 on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy], J.O. [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], January 18, 1975, p. 739 (Fr.). 
 65 Id. art.161–4. 
 66 Id. art.161–5. 
 67 Loi 2001–588 du 4 juillet 2001 relative à l’interruption volontaire de la 
grossesse et à la contraception [Law 2001–588 of July 4, 2001 on the voluntary 
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of pregnancy “in a situation of stress” up to the tw lfth week.68  More 
importantly, the new bill abolished the mandatory counseling 
procedure, except for girls underage.69   Now, counseling is only 
“systematically suggested, before and after the voluntary interruption 
of pregnancy.”70   A system akin to the Italian one, instead, has 
recently been adopted in Portugal.71  A right to abortion exists “by 
option of the woman, within the first ten weeks of pregnancy.”72  
Women who seek an abortion must undergo mandatory cunseling 
and a three-day mandatory waiting period has also been established.73 
Spain too has finally recently enacted a new abortion act74 along 
the above-mentioned model, with the explicit purpose f reflecting 
“the consensus of the international community in ths field”75 and “the 
legislative trend prevailing among [European] states.”76  Contrary to 
the Ley organica 9/1985, which simply stated that abortion “will not 
 
interruption of pregnancy and contraception],  JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 7, 2001, p. 10823.  The law 
was challenged before the Conseil Constitutionnel.  See Conseil Constitutional 
decision No. 2001-446 DC, June 27, 2001; Conseil Constitutionnel decision No. 
2001-449 DC, July 4, 2001 (declaring the law consitutional). 
 68 CODE DE LA SANTE [Health Code], art. 2212–1, modified by Loi 2001–588, 
du 4 juillet 2001 (Fr.) (“dans une de détresse”). 
 69 Id. art. 2212–4, modified by Loi 2001–588, du 4 juillet 2001 (Fr.). 
 70 Id. (“systématiquement proposé, avant et après l’interruption volontaire de 
grossesse.”). 
 71 See Lei 16/2007 de 17 de Abril 2007, Exclusão da ilicitude nos casos de 
interrupção voluntária da gravide [Law 16/2007 of April 17, 2007, Excluding 
unlawfulness in cases of voluntary interruption of pregnancy],17.4 DIÁRIO da 
REPÚBLICA [DAILY REPUBLIC] (2007) (Port.). 
 72 CODIGO PENAL [Criminal Code], Art. 142(1)(e), modified by Art. 1, Law 
16/2007 (“por opção da mulher, nas primeiras 10 semanas de gravidez”).  
 73 Id. art. 142(4)(b).  
 74 See Ley Organica de salud sexual y reproductive y de la interrucion 
voluntaria del embarazo [Sexual and Reproductive Health and Abortion Law] 
(B.O.E. 2010, 55) (Spain).  The 2010 Act has been challenged before the Tribunal 
Constitucional [Constitutional Court], which still has to deliver its decision.  See 
Julio Lazaro, El Constitucional admite el recurso del PP contra la ley del aborto 
[The Constitution allows the use of PP against abortion law], EL PAIS, (Spain), June 
30, 2011, available at 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Constitucional/admite/recurso/PP/ley/abort
o/elpepusoc/20100630elpepusoc_4/Tes. 
 75 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Abortion Law, pmbl. I. (“[e]l consenso 
de la comunidad internacional en esta materia”). 
 76 Id. pmbl. II (“la tendencia normativa imperante en los países [europeos]”). 
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be punishable”77 if performed with the consent of the woman by a 
physician at any time for medical reasons, within twelve weeks of 
pregnancy in the case of rape and up to the twenty-second week in 
case of fetal impairment, the new Ley organica 2/2010 has introduced 
a right to abortion “at the request of the woman”78 up to the fourteenth 
week of pregnancy, after a three-day waiting period an  a counseling 
meeting in which women are informed about the means of ocial 
assistance and public support available for mothers.79  Abortion is then 
permitted until the twenty-second week on medical grounds and when 
there are risks of fetal impairment or with no limit if a medical team 
certifies that the fetus has no reasonable possibility of surviving 
delivery.80 
In contrast, Germany has the most restrictive model f abortion 
regulation among the EU Member States in which abortion is 
permitted.81  After unification, an Act was adopted in 1992,82 which, 
in order to harmonize the law in force in East Germany83 (where 
women had a right to abortion until the twelfth week of pregnancy 
after mandatory counseling) and in West Germany84 (where abortion 
was prohibited save on four enumerated grounds),85  made first-
 
 77 CÓDIGO PENAL [Penal Code] art. 417 (Spain), as modified by Ley Organica 
9/1985 (B.O.E. 1985, 166) (“no será punible”).  The 1985 Act was challenged before 
the Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional court], which declared it constituional in 
its decision in S.T.C. Apr. 11, 1985 (B.O.E. No. 53) (Spain). 
 78 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Abortion Law, art. 14 (“a petición de 
la mujer”). 
 79 Id. art. 17.  
 80 Id. art. 15.  
 81 See Maleck-Lewy, supra note 36, at 62; see also Schlegel, supra note 54, at 
52. 
 82 See Schwangeren-und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and F mily 
Assistance Act], July 27, 1992, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1398 
(Ger.). 
 83 See Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangershaft  [Act on Abortion], 
Mar. 9, 1972, GESETZBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK, TEIL I 
[GDDR I] at 89 (Ger.). 
 84 See Fünfzehntes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz [Fifteenth Amendment to the 
Criminal Law], May 21, 1976, BGBL I at 1213. (Ger.). 
 85 See id. art. 1(4) (declaring, on the basis of the “indication model” 
(Indikationslösung), that abortion was “nicht strafbar [not punishable]” if 
performed:  (1) at any time, on medical grounds, (2) within the first twenty-two 
weeks, on embryopathic grounds, (3) within the first twelve weeks, on criminal-
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trimester abortions lawful after mandatory counseling.  Nevertheless, 
in 1993, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, following a 1975 precedent86 
quashing the first West German Abortion Act,87 declared the 1992 Act 
unconstitutional,88 arguing that the State had a duty to protect human 
life, and that, therefore, legislation ought to express a clear disapproval 
of abortions.89 
In reaction to this decision, the German Parliament enacted a new 
abortion Act in 1995,90 amending, among other things, the Criminal 
Code.  On the basis of the new law, abortion is unlawful, but may not 
be punished,91 if it is performed at the request of the woman, by a 
medical practitioner, before the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy, 
after a mandatory counseling session and a three-day waiting period,92 
 
ethical grounds, and (4) within the first twelve weeks, on social grounds).  See 
Maleck-Lewy, supra note 36, at 67. 
 86 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, 1975 (Ger.).  This firt decision of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht as been the object of extensive comparative analysis 
with the abortion decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.  See John Gorby & Robert 
Jonas, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL 
J. PRAC. &  PROC. 551 (1976). 
 87 See Fünftes Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts [5.StrRG] [Fifth Act to 
Reform the Criminal Law], June 18, 1974, BGBl I at 1297 (Ger.). 
 88 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
May 28, 1993, 88 BVERFGE 203,1993 (Ger.).  
 89 Cf. Gerald Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to 
Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273 (1995) 
(offering a comparative analysis of Abortion Law in Germany and the United 
States).  
 90 See Schwangeren-und Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz [SFHAndG] 
[Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act], Aug. 21, 1995, BGBL I at 1050 (Ger.). 
 91 A subtle distinction is indeed drawn in German criminal law between the 
abstract lawfulness of an act and the effective possibility to sanction an act.  As such, 
an act may be lawful and therefore, not punishable, or an act may be unlawful.  In 
the latter case, however, an act might still not be punishable when other compelling 
reasons push for the lifting of the criminal sanction.  The 1992 Act had made first 
trimester abortion not unlawful, but the Bundesverfassungsgericht declared the 
measure unconstitutional to the extent to which it failed to protect the right to life of 
the unborn.  The 1995 Act, therefore, made abortion s mply “not punishable,” in 
order to express a clear disapproval for abortion,.  See Neuman, supra note 89, at 
285. 
 92 STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], Aug. 21, 1995, BGBL I  § 218a(1) 
(Ger.) as amended by SFHAndG, art. 8. 
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In contrast, abortion is “not unlawful”93  if performed, at any time, 
under medical indication to prevent danger to the life of or serious 
harm to the health of the woman or, within the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy, on criminal-ethical grounds, e.g., because the pregnancy 
was the result of rape.94 
The mandatory counseling process is a peculiar featur  of the 1995 
German abortion Act.95   Following an explicit request by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the law clarifies that the counseling must 
be pro-life oriented;96 that is, the counseling must be directed toward 
encouraging the woman to continue the pregnancy and to open her to 
the perspective of a life with the child.  Social assistants and family 
planning centers must therefore inform women that te unborn has a 
right to life and that abortion can only be performed under exceptional 
circumstances.  From this point of view, the regulation of abortion via 
the instruments of criminal law and the imposition f a directive 
counseling procedure highlight the German legal system’s restrictive 
attitude toward the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.97  At the same 
time, however, the possibility for a woman to obtain an abortion 
during the first trimester, if she still wishes to do so after the 
mandatory counseling and three-day waiting period, differentiates the 
German law from the legislative model of the last group of EU 
countries—Malta, Poland and Ireland—where abortion is generally 
always prohibited, with only a few, narrowly tailored exceptions.98 
Poland swiftly enacted legislation banning elective abortion in 
1993, following the collapse of the Communist regime.99  The new 
Act permits abortion only if:  (1) a physician, other than the one which 
 
 93 Id. § 218a(2) (Ger.) (“nicht Rechtswidrig”). 
 94 Id. § 218a(3) (Ger.). 
 95 See Nanette Funk, Abortion Counselling and the 1995 German Abortion 
Law, 12 CONN. J. INT’L L. 33, 51 (1997) (discussing the importance of the 
counseling process in the German abortion regime). 
 96 See STGB, § 219 (Ger.) as amended by SFHAndG, art. 8. 
 97 See Funk, supra note 95, at 57; see also JACKSON &  TUSHNET, supra note 
15 (describing how the German abortion law limits abortions by requiring 
mandatory counseling). 
 98 See Eser & Koch, supra note 22, at 46 (defining the “prohibition model” 
approach to abortion); Forder, supra note 22, at 85–86 (explaining how the German 
approach to abortion is less restrictive than the Irish one). 
 99 See Magdalena Zolkos, Human Rights and Democracy in the Polish 
Abortion Debate, 3 ESSEX HUM. RIGHTS REV. 1–4 (2006). 
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performs the abortion, certifies that the pregnancy is endangering the 
mother’s life or health; (2) up to viability (i.e., up to the twenty-fourth 
week), if the fetus is seriously impaired; or (3) up to the twelfth week, 
if pregnancy resulted from rape.100  Terminating pregnancy outside 
these cases may be punished with three years’ imprisonment.  A 
legislative attempt in 1996 to reform the law and re-introduce a right 
to abortion in the first trimester on grounds of material or personal 
hardship failed.  The Trybunał Konstytcyjny declared the bill 
incompatible with the Constitution, interpreting the right to life 
provision of the Polish Constitution as protecting the unborn.101 
Of all European countries, Ireland has the most restrictive 
legislation on abortion.102  On the basis of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861,103 the content of which was re-affirmed in the Health 
(Family Planning) Act 1979,104 “[e]very woman, being with child, 
who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall unlawfully 
administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall 
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like 
intent . . . to procure the miscarriage . . . shall be liable to be kept in 
 
 100 Act on Family-Planning, Human Embryo Protection and Conditions of 
Legal Pregnancy Termination, Jan. 7, 1993, § 4(a) (an English translation of this 
provision is available in Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007–I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38).  The fact that 
Poland only permits abortion in these three specific ases differentiates Polish 
legislation and makes it more restrictive than German legislation, where abortion is 
not punishable (although it is not lawful) in a wider array of circumstances.  See 
supra text accompanying note 91.  Still, undoubtedly, the Polish abortion law is 
more permissive, at least on the books, than the Irish one.  See supra text 
accompanying note 99–101. 
 101 Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Court] May 28, 1997, K 
26/96.  But see the dissenting opinions of Judges Garlicki and Sokolewicza.  See also 
Alicia Czerwinski, Sex, Politics and Religion: the Clash Between Poland d the 
European Union over Abortion, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. &  POL’Y 653, 659–60 (2004) 
(discussing the Polish abortion regime and its tensions with EU law). 
 102 See Forder, supra note 22, at 57.  See also TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 
85.  
 103 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. 236, c. 100 
(U.K.).  Note that this Act was adopted by the U.K. and applied in Ireland because, 
until 1922, the U.K. exercised dominion over Ireland.  See Gerard Hogan, An 
Introduction to Irish Public Law, 1 EUR. PUB. L. 37 (1995). 
 104 Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 (Act No. 20/1979), § 10 (Ir.). 
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penal servitude for life.”105  Contrary to the interpretation of the 1861 
Act offered by the English courts,106 Irish tribunals have traditionally 
adopted a narrow construction of the provision excluding the lifting of 
criminal sanctions, even when abortion is carried out t  preserve the 
life or the health of the woman.107 
In 1983, to prevent a possible recognition of a right to abortion by 
judicial fiat,108 an amendment to the Irish Constitution was adopted by 
popular referendum, which enshrined a right to life o  the unborn in 
Irish fundamental law.109   According to the Eighth Amendment, 
codified as Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution, “the State 
acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to 
the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, 
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend a vindicate that 
right.”110  The amendment generated a cluster of litigation.  Much of 
this litigation dealt with the issue of whether the state could prohibit 
distribution of information on abortion services provided in other EU 
 
 105 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, §§ 58, 59.  The same penalty 
applies to the doctor performing the abortion.  It is a misdemeanor to supply a 
woman with the poisons or instruments necessary to procure an abortion.  
 106 See R. v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687.  In this decision, the King’s 
Bench, per Justice Macnaughten, affirmed that § 58 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 “ought to be construed in a reasonable sense, and, if the doctor is of 
the opinion, on reasonable grounds and with adequat knowledge, that the probable 
consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a 
physical or mental wreck,” abortion should be permitted on therapeutic grounds.  Id.
at 693–94. 
 107 See Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan, 
[1989] I.R. 753 (Ir.) (where Justice Keane affirmed that “the preponderance of 
judicial opinion in this country would suggest that the Bourne approach could not 
have been adopted . . . consistently with the Constitution prior to the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
 108 Note that in McGee v. Attorney General, [1974] I.R. 284, the Irish 
Supreme Court had recognized a fundamental right to privacy as either an 
unenumerated personal right or a familial right.  As a result, there was widespread 
preoccupation that the Irish Supreme Court would follow the path of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, whose decision recognizing a right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), followed from its decision recognizi g a right to privacy in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 86. 
On the U.S. constitutional issues of abortion law, seeinfra Section 3. 
 109 See John Quinlan, The Right to Life of the Unborn—An Assessment of 
the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, 3 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 383–90 
(1984). 
 110 IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3, as amended by the Eighth Am. (1983).   
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countries.  This litigation involved the ECJ and the ECtHR111 and 
eventually led to the adoption of two further constitutional 
amendments explicitly guaranteeing a right to travel to other states in 
order to obtain an abortion,112 as well as a right to provide information 
about abortion services performed overseas.113 
The specific consequences of Article 40.3.3 on the prohibition of 
abortion were addressed in the seminal X. case.114  This case involved 
a fourteen-year-old female rape victim who became pregnant.  The girl 
wanted an abortion and showed clear signs of suicidal tendencies if 
she could not obtain one.  Her family agreed to bring her to England 
for the abortion.  On the Attorney General’s application, however, the 
Irish High Court issued an injunction prohibiting the girl from leaving 
Ireland on the basis of the new constitutional provisi n protecting the 
life of the unborn.  According to the Court, the “risk that the defendant 
may take her own life if an order is made is much less and is of a 
different order of magnitude than the certainty that the life of the 
unborn will be terminated if the order is not made.”115 
The decision of the High Court sparked widespread controversy 
and was quickly overruled by a majority of the Irish Supreme Court.  
On appeal, Chief Justice Finlay framed a new test to review the 
lawfulness of an abortion in light of Article 40.3.3 of the Irish 
Constitution:  “if it is established as a matter of probability that there is 
a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the 
mother, which can only be avoided by the termination f her 
pregnancy, such termination is permissible.”116  The Court recognized 
that suicide could be considered as a real and substantial risk to the life 
of the woman and therefore concluded that the defenant had a right to 
obtain an abortion in Ireland.117  Attempts have been made since the X. 
 
 111 See infra Section 2. 
 112 IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3(2), as amended by the Thirteenth Am. 
(1992). 
 113 IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3(3), as amended by the Fourteenth Am. 
(1992). 
 114 See Cole, supra note 3, at 129–135; Forder, supra note 22, at 57–58. 
 115 Att’y Gen. v. X, [1992] I.L.R.M. 401, 410 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).  
 116 Att’y Gen. v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 41, 53–54 (S.C.) (Ir.). 
 117 Id. at 55.  Although the opinion of the Irish Supreme Court left some 
doubts as to whether abortion could be obtained in Ireland in case of real and 
substantial risk to the woman’s life, this possibility was later confirmed by the High 
Court in A. and B. v. E. Health Bd., [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 478–79 (H. Ct.) (Ir.). 
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case to restrict the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 40.3.3 by 
enacting new constitutional amendments directed at excluding suicide 
from the conditions that may justify a therapeutic abortion.  All of 
these attempts, however, have failed in popular referenda.118 
As a result, the current status of abortion law in Ireland appears to 
be that, constitutionally, termination of pregnancy is unlawful “unless 
it meets the conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in the X. 
case.”119  Women have both a constitutional right to travel to seek an 
abortion overseas and to obtain information about abortion services 
provided in other EU Member States pursuant to the 1995 Information 
Act.120   However, no specific regulation exists on the basis of which a 
woman can establish her right to obtain a lawful abortion in Ireland on 
grounds of a real and serious risk to her life, including a risk of 
suicide.121  In fact, no lawful abortion is known to have ever been 
 
 118 The proposed Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution would have 
allowed abortion only when “necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of 
the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to real and 
substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction.”  RAYMOND BYRNE &  
WILLIAM BINCHY, ANNUAL REVIEW OF IRISH LAW 1992, 195–97 (1992).  The 
proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in November 1992.  Id..  The 
proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, Protection of Human Life in 
Pregnancy Bill, 2001 sched. 2 §1(2), available at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2001/4801/b48b01d.pdf, would 
have allowed abortion only when “necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of 
loss of the woman’s life other than by self-destruction.”  The proposal was rejected 
in a popular referendum in March 2002.  RAYMOND BYRNE &  WILLIAM BINCHY, 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF IRISH LAW 2001, at 113.  
 119 DEP’T OF THE TAOISEACH, THE GREEN PAPER ON ABORTION 3 (1999), 
available at  
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_20
06/Publications_for_1999/Green_Paper_on_Abortion.html   This report was 
prepared at the request of the Irish government to clarify the legal framework of 
abortion in Irish law. 
 120 Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination 
of Pregnancy) Act 1995 (Act No. 5/1995) § 3.  
 The Act makes it legal to distribute information o abortion services abroad 
as long as the information does not promote abortion.  The Irish Supreme Court was 
asked to decide on the abstract and  priori constitutionality of the Act, and it 
unanimously upheld it.  See In re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Regulation 
of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancy) Bill, 
[1995] 1 I.R. 1 (S.C.)(Ir.). 
 121 See infra text accompanying notes 321–337. 
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carried out in Ireland,122 effectively making Ireland the EU country in 
which abortion is most severely restricted. 
As the preceding survey clarifies, a variety of regulatory models 
exists in the EU Member States in the field of abortion law.  In all 
legal systems, however, abortion is permitted at any time, at least on 
the law in the books, if necessary to save the life of the woman.  
Almost every country recognizes the right to an abortion on medical 
health grounds, to varying degrees.  Further, a cler tr nd exists among 
a majority of states toward the legalization of elective abortion roughly 
within the first trimester of pregnancy, either upon the simple request 
of the woman, or upon the request of the woman certified (on wide 
social grounds) by medical doctors, or after a mandatory counseling 
period, be it of a neutral or life-oriented kind.  Finally, all state 
abortion laws are subjected to the increasing influe ce of 
supranational laws. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF SUPRANATIONAL LAW ON STATES’ 
ABORTION LAWS  
In the last two decades, the legal orders of the EU and the ECHR 
have steadily increased their involvement in the field of abortion law, 
and both the ECJ and the ECtHR have reviewed states’ bortion 
legislations with growing frequency.123  Although the authority to 
regulate abortion rights remains primarily in the purview of the EU 
Member States, a series of substantive checks and procedural balances 
on the exercise of national sovereignty have been developed in this 
area, mainly by the jurisprudence of the two European supranational 
courts.124  Indeed, as David Cole has argued, the interplay between 
 
 122 See IPPF, supra note 22, at 39.  
 123 See Forder, supra note 22, at 56 (arguing that “recent developments 
have shown that abortion also has a transnational chara ter.  It is no longer possible 
for one country to regulate abortion without regard to what is happening elsewhere 
in Europe.  Both the [ECJ] and the [ECtHR] have bared their teeth, and shown that 
there are certain minimum standards which must be met”).  See also Lawson, supra 
note 3, at 167.  For an assessment of the impact of in ernational human rights law on 
national abortion legislation outside the European context, see g nerally Cyra 
Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law Progress through 
International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259 (2011). 
 124 Compare the open view in Bryan Mercurio, Abortion In Ireland: An 
Analysis of the Legal Transformation Resulting from Membership in the European 
Union, 11 TUL. J. INT’L &  COMP. L. 141 (2003), with the extremely sovereigntist 
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European and domestic laws on abortion has now reached such a level 
of complexity that national “isolationism is impossible, even on an 
issue as strongly felt as abortion.”125  
In the 1991 Grogan case,126 the ECJ had the opportunity to rule on 
the abortion issue in the context of a preliminary reference procedure 
from the Irish High Court.127  In this case, the Society for the 
Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) had requested an injunction 
prohibiting the representatives of three student unions from advertising 
the names and contacts details of overseas abortion providers, arguing 
that the recently enacted Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution 
banned the publication of any such information.128  In its preliminary 
reference, the High Court asked the ECJ whether abotion could be 
considered a service within the meaning of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Treaty (EECT)129  and, therefore, whether a 
national ban on information about abortion services overseas was 
 
view in Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, Right to Life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in 
Services: the European Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European 
Union, 55 MOD. L. REV. 670 (1992).  
 125 Cole, supra note 3, at 115. 
 126 Case C-159/90, Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd.v. 
Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685. 
 127 The preliminary reference procedure is the technical mechanism, 
regulated by art. 267 TFEU (as in effect since 2009) (former EC Treaty art. 234), by 
which a lower state court can, or a state court of last instance shall, request from the 
ECJ a judgment on the interpretation of or on the validity of a EU law, which is of 
relevance in the case pending before it.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 164.  
See Jeffrey Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme Court 
Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44 
AM. J. COMP. L. 421 (1996); Paul Craig, The Jurisdiction of the Community Courts 
Reconsidered, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 177 (Grainne de Búrca & 
Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 2001). 
 128 Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 
753, 758 (H. Ct.). (Ir.).  While the Irish High Court referred the question to the ECJ, 
it stayed the proceedings and did not grant the injunction requested by SPUC barring 
the student from publishing information about abortion providers.  SPUC appealed 
to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted  t mporary injunction but did 
not interfere with the High Court’s decision to raise a preliminary reference to the 
ECJ.  Rather, the Supreme Court gave the parties leave to apply to the High Court 
again in order to adjust the injunction in light of the ECJ’s decision.  Prot. of Unborn 
Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, [1989] 4 I.R. 760, 765–66 (S.C.) (Ir.). 
 129 Cf. Cole, supra note 3, at 126–127; Mercurio, supra note 124, at 156–
57. 
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contrary to EEC law, including the fundamental rights protected by 
EEC law.130 
Advocate General (AG) Van Gerven acknowledged that medical 
termination of pregnancy constituted a service within e meaning of 
the EECT.  Therefore, he devoted most of his opinion to examining 
whether the Irish prohibition on distributing information about 
abortion services that are lawfully available in other EU states could 
be regarded as “consistent with or not incompatible with” the general 
principles of EU law, including respect for fundamental rights.131  
However, the AG found that the Irish restriction was justified in light 
of the public interest pursued by the state and of the “high priority” the 
Irish Constitution attached to the protection of unborn life. 132  In 
addition, the AG concluded that the ban on information sought by 
SPUC did not disproportionately infringe upon freedom of 
information, which is protected as a general principle of EEC law and 
is thus binding upon the Member States “in an area covered by EEC 
law.”133 
 
 130 See Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm─Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, ¶ 
7 (affirming that fundamental rights are general principles of EU law).  In the 
absence of a written EU catalog of fundamental rights (which was only recently 
introduced with the enactment of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) the ECJ for 
long time drew inspiration for its human rights jurisprudence from the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States and especially from the ECHR.  See 
Case 4/73, Nold v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 491, ¶ 13; Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union, art. 6, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 19 [hereinafter 
EU Treaty].  See also José N. Cunha Rodriguez, The Incorporation of Fundamental 
Rights in the Community Legal Order, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW:  THE 
CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 
89, 91 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loic Azulai eds., 2010).  The ECJ has recognized 
that  both the EU institutions as well as the EU Memb r States must respect 
fundamental rights as general principles of EU law when acting within the scope of 
application of EU law.  See Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und 
Forstwirtschaft, 1989 E.C.R. 2609, ¶ 17–19; Case C-260/89, ERT, 1991 E.C.R. I-
2925, ¶ 41.  See also Zdenek Kühn, Wachauf and ERT: On the Road from the 
Centralized to the Decentralized System of Judicial Review, in THE PAST AND 
FUTURE OF EU LAW:  THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 151 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loic Azulai 
eds., 2010). 
 131 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Case C-159/90, Soc’y for 
the Prot. of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, 199  E.C.R. I-4685, ¶ 24. 
 132 Id. ¶ 29. 
 133 Id. ¶ 31. 
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The ECJ followed only the very first part of the opinion of the AG, 
stating that “medical termination of pregnancy, performed in 
accordance with the law of the State in which it is carried out, 
constitutes a service within the meaning of the EECT.”134  The ECJ 
rejected the contention made by SPUC that abortion c uld not be 
regarded as a service since it is immoral and stated that it would not 
“substitute its assessment for that of the legislature in those Member 
States where the activities in question are practiced legally.”135  
However, on the controversial question of the compatibility of the 
Irish ban on the publication of information with EEC law, the ECJ 
refused to take a position, arguing that the link between the Irish 
student unions and the U.K. abortion providers was “too tenuous”136 to 
trigger the application of EEC law.137 
The ECJ, therefore, failed to address directly the confrontation 
between the Irish ban and EU fundamental rights,138 howing a certain 
reluctance to deal with the “thorny issue” of abortion.139  Nevertheless, 
by stating that a Member State had the power to prohibit student 
unions from distributing information about abortion clinics that are 
lawfully operating in another EU state, so long as “the clinics in 
question have no involvement in the distribution ofthe said 
information,”140 the ECJ “left open the possibility that, should a party 
directly connected to providing abortion become involved, the 
outcome could be different.”141   In addition, by concluding that 
abortion was a service within the meaning of the EECT,142 the ECJ 
made clear “that Ireland’s treatment of access to ab rtion was not 
 
 134 Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685, ¶ 21. 
 135 Id. ¶ 20. 
 136 Id. ¶ 24. 
 137 See Lawson, supra note 3, 173; Cole, supra note 3, 128. 
 138 See Siofra O’Leary, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to 
Provide Services: The Court of Justice as a Reluctant Constitutional Adjudicator: 
An Examination of the Abortion Information Case, 16 EUR. L. REV. 138, 156 (1992).  
 139 Catherine Barnard, An Irish Solution, 142 NEW L.J. 526 (1992). 
 140 Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685, ¶ 32. 
 141 Mercurio, supra note 124, at 160. 
 142 David O’Connor, Limiting “Public Morality” Exceptions to Free 
Movement in Europe: Ireland’s Role in a Changing European Union, 22 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 695, 702–03 (1997). 
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simply a matter of Irish law”143 but also a matter of concern for EU 
law.144 
Ireland understood the pressures arising from the EU legal system 
on domestic abortion legislation.  On the eve of the approval of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Ireland obtained from its EU partners the 
enactment of an additional protocol to the EU Treaty stating that 
“nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities, or in the Traties or Acts 
modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application 
in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.”145  
Nevertheless, the “special case” approach sought by Ireland produced 
domestic public outcry,146  forcing Ireland to retract its position by 
adding a “negative declaration” to the EU Treaty, rest icting the 
meaning of the Protocol.147  Consequentially, it seems that the status 
of EU law vis-à-vis Irish abortion law has not changed very much at 
all.148 
The ECtHR has followed a more direct path toward involvement in 
abortion rights.149  When the ECHR was adopted in 1950, abortion 
 
 143 Cole, supra note 3, at 129. 
 144 See Alison Young, The Charter, Constitution and Human Rights: Is 
This the Beginning or the End for Human Rights Protections by Community Law?, 
11 EUR. PUB. L. 219, 230 (2005) (arguing  that “Grogan can be regarded as a 
triumph for the right of the woman to choose.”). 
 145 Protocol Annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities, Feb. 7, 1992, 1 92 O.J. (C 224/130). 
 146 Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of 
Bits and Pieces, 30 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 17, 48 (1993), (arguing that the 
negative reaction in Ireland to the additional Protoc l negotiated by the Irish 
government was “exacerbated by the Irish Supreme Court’s . . . ruling in [the] X. 
[case]”). 
 147 Declaration of the High Contracting Parties to the Tr aty on European 
Union, May 1, 1992, available at http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/archives/en/entr3.htm, 
(stating that “the Protocol shall not limit freedom either to travel between Member 
States or . . . to obtain or make available in Ireland information relating to services 
lawfully available in Member States.”).  See Chris Hilson, The Unpatriotism of the 
Economic Constitution? Rights to Free Movement and their Impact on National and 
European Identity, 14 EUR. L. J. 186, 191–92 (2008). 
 148 Cf. Forder, supra note 22, at 64 (arguing that “the Declaration . . . 
confirms the law as it was after SPUC v. Grogan and thus sets the course for a head-
on collision between the Irish constitution and Community law.”). 
 149 See Alec Stone Sweet, Sur la constitutionnalisation de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme: cinquante ans après son installation, la Cour 
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was of course still regarded as a criminal issue in all of the signatory 
parties.  Therefore, it was not the intention of the drafters of the ECHR 
to codify a substantive limitation on the national powers to regulate 
abortion.150   Nevertheless, the ECHR does include a number of 
provisionssuch as the right to life,151 the right to respect for private 
and family life,152 and freedom of information153which, over time, 
became increasingly relevant in litigation challenging Member States’ 
abortion legislations.154    
Until the 1990s, the ECtHR did not have the opportunity to decide 
cases concerning national abortion laws.  Prior to the 1998 enactment 
of the 11th additional Protocol to the ECHR, all individual applications 
lodged before the ECtHR were first addressed by the European Human 
Rights Commission (ECommHR).155  In the few abortion cases raised 
 
européenne des droits de l’homme conçue comme une co r constitutionnelle [On the 
Constitutionalization of the European Convention on Human Rights:  Fifty years 
after its Establishment, the European Court of Human Rights is Viewed as a 
Constitutional Court], 80 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 923 
(2009) (describing the increasing importance of the ECHR as an instrument for the 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe and for the supervision of Member 
States’ conduct).  
 150 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights 
Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000) 
(providing an historical assessment of the origins of the ECHR); see also Danny 
Nicol, Original Intent and the European Convention on Human Rights, PUB. L. 152 
(2005). 
 151 ECHR art. 2. 
 152 ECHR art. 8. 
 153 ECHR art. 10. 
 154 The ECHR recognizes a detailed catalogue of civil and political rights 
that Member States can limit only according to the conditions provided by the 
ECHR itself and subject to the ECtHR’s proportionality-based review.  See Alec 
Stone Sweet & Jude Matthews, Proportionality, Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73 (2008). 
 155 The institutional machinery of the ECHR has been evolving.  
Individuals can directly lodge an application befor the supervisory bodies of the 
ECHR, after they have exhausted the domestic avenues of r course and if they allege 
to be victims of a violation of fundamental rights by a contracting party.  Until the 
enactment of the 11th additional Protocol to the ECHR, applications were first 
examined by the ECommHR, which sought to achieve a friendly settlement of the 
dispute and decided the issue with a decision.  Decisions by the ECommHR could 
then be appealed to the ECtHR.  Since the 11th additional Protocol to the ECHR has 
come into force, instead, the ECommHR has been eliminated and individuals can 
directly lodge an application before the ECtHR under th  conditions provided by 
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before the Strasbourg institution, the ECommHR adopted a prudent 
stand:156  on the one hand, it declared inadmissible the challenges, 
based on the right-to-life provision of the ECHR,157 made against 
some liberal domestic abortion laws (including the 1967 U.K. 
Abortion Act).158 On the other hand, it rejected on the merits a 
challenge against the restrictive 1975 German abortion statute, which 
was raised on the basis of the right-to-privacy provisi n of the 
ECHR.159 
The first abortion case before the ECtHR arose out of the SPUC 
controversy in Ireland, which had previously compelled the ECJ to 
intervene.160  Pursuant to Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution, the 
SPUC had obtained an injunction from the Irish High Court,161 later 
confirmed by the Supreme Court,162 which perpetually prohibited two 
Dublin-based family planning and counseling clinics from providing 
information concerning the availability of abortion services in the 
 
Art. 35 ECHR.  See Antonio Bultrini, Il meccanismo di protezione dei diritti 
fondamentali istituito dalla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo: Cenni 
introduttivi [The Mechanism of Protection of Fundamental Rights Es ablished by the 
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ITALIANO  [THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:  PROFILES AND 
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THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ch. 24 (4th ed. 2006)  
 156 See Lawson, supra note 3, at 170. 
 157 See David Harris, The Right to Life Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 1 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &  COMP. L.  122., 126–27 (1994). 
 158  X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8416/79, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep. 244 (1980) (declaring inadmissible a challenge against the U.K. Abortion 
Act 1967 based on the claim that Art. 2 ECHR protected the right to life of the 
fetus).  See also R.H. v. Norway, App. No. 17004/90, 73 Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 155(1992) (declaring inadmissible a challenge against the Norwegian 
legislation on abortion based on the claim that Art. 2 protected the right to life of the 
fetus). 
 159 See Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Germany, App. No. 5969/75, 10 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 100 (1977) (rejecting on the merits a challenge to the 
German regulation of abortion established by the 1976 Fünfzehntes 
Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz based on the claim that Art. 8 ECHR extended to protect 
the right of privacy of the woman to decide whether to terminate pregnancy).  
 160 See Mercurio, supra note 124, at 155–56. 
 161 SPUC v. Open Door Counselling, [1988] I.R. 593 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).  
 162 Id. at 618.   
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U.K.163  Having exhausted their domestic remedies, the two clinics 
lodged an appeal before the ECHR supervisory bodies, arguing that 
the Irish ban unduly limited their freedom of expression.  The 
ECommHR declared the case admissible and,164 in its preliminary 
report, found that the law violated Article 10 ECHR because the ban 
was not prescribed by law, since it was not reasonably foreseeable that 
Article 40.3.3 would have been interpreted as prohibiting the non-
directive counseling conducted by the two clinics.165 
The decision of the ECommHR laid the foundation for the ruling 
of ECtHR in Open Door,166 which also found a violation of Article 10 
ECHR.167  However, in Open Door, the ECtHR did not follow the 
reasoning of the ECommHR; rather, in a fifteen-to-eight majority 
opinion, the ECtHR concluded that the national measure under review 
could not pass judicial scrutiny, even under a more restrictive test.168  
According to the ECtHR, the prohibition barring the two clinics from 
providing information about abortion services overseas could be 
regarded as prescribed by law—that is, grounded in the Eighth 
Amendment to the Irish Constitution—and necessary to pursue the 
legitimate aim of the Irish State to protect the lif  of the unborn.169  
But, the “absolute nature”170  of the “restraint imposed on the 
applicants from receiving or imparting information was 
 
 163 Having succeed in obtaining a judicial injunction barring the two 
Dublin-based counseling clinics, Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well 
Woman Centre Ltd., from circulating information about abortion service providers in 
the U.K., SPUC started a proceeding against the studen s associations.  This 
proceeding then lead to the decision of the ECJ in Case C-159/90, Soc’y for the Prot. 
of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685. 
 164 Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, App. No. 14234/88 & 14235/88, 
May 15, 1990.  
 165 Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, App. No. 14234/88 & 14235/88, 14 
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 166 Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, App. No. 14234/88 & 14235/88, 
246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 73 (1992) [hereinafter Open Door]. 
 167 See Lawson, supra note 3, at 177. 
 168 See Cole, supra note 3, at 135. 
 169 Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 60–63. 
 170 Id. ¶ 73. 
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disproportionate to the aims pursued”171 and was thus in violation of 
the right to freedom of information.172   
After declaring in Open Door that a state’s ban on the circulation 
of information about abortion was contrary to the ECHR’s freedom-
of-expression clause,173 the ECtHR was asked to review a number of 
other national measures directly regulating abortion for their 
compatibility with the ECHR’s right-to-life and right-to-privacy 
clauses.  Whereas the ECtHR has rejected all pro-life c aims raised 
against permissive state abortion laws,174 it has also “carefully avoided 
stating whether abortion is protected under the ECHR,”175 leaving to 
the contracting parties a margin of appreciation to determine the 
availability and legal status of abortion.176  Yet, the ECtHR has 
squarely affirmed that “legislation regulating abortion falls under the 
sphere of Article 8 [ECHR] and statutory abortion rest ictions may 
constitute an interference with women’s private livs.”177 
In a series of cases challenging national laws on abortion on the 
basis of Article 2 ECHR, the ECtHR has deferred to d mestic 
legislation,178 rejecting the argument that the fetus could be regarded 
 
 171 Id. ¶ 80. 
 172 The decision of the ECtHR reached an issue that, as mentioned supra 
in the text accompanying note 137, was not addressed by the ECJ in Case C-159/90, 
Grogan, 1991 ECR I-4685.  AG Van Gerven, instead, had reach d the issue and 
concluded that the Irish ban on the freedom to provide information about abortion 
providers overseas did not violate Article 10 ECHR.  See supra text accompanying 
note 134. 
 173 See Cole, supra note 3, at 138. 
 174 See Christina Zampas & Jaime Gher, Abortion as a Human Rights – 
International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. R. L. REV. 249, 264 (2008). 
 175 Id. at 276. 
 176 On the doctrine of the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation, see generally 
Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation in the Case-Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND 
VÖLKERRECHT 240 (1996); Palmina Tanzarella, Il margine di apprezzamento [The 
Margin of Appreciation], in I DIRITTI IN AZIONE [RIGHTS IN ACTION]14 (Marta 
Cartabia ed., 2007).  
 177 Zampas & Gher, supra note 174, at 276. 
 178 Art. 2(1) ECHR (“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.  
No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence 
of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided 
by law”).  See also Zampas & Gher, supra note 174, at 264–65 (discussing how 
“each of the abortion laws at issue in these cases were fairly liberal.  It is unclear 
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as a person within the meaning of the ECHR.179  In Boso,180 the Court 
upheld the Italian abortion statute, arguing that the domestic 
legislation struck “a fair balance between, on the on hand, the need to 
ensure protection of the fetus and, on the other [hand], the woman’s 
interests.”181  In addition, in Vo,182 the ECtHRwhile expressing its 
awareness that it was neither desirable, nor even possible as matters 
stood, to answer in the abstract the question when lif  begins and 
“whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of 
the [ECHR]”183 concluded that the French law at issue did not 
violate the right-to-life clause of ECHR.184  
In Tysiąc, 185 however, the ECtHR took the important step of 
finding a violation of Article 8 ECHR in the operation of the 
restrictive Polish abortion law.186  The case involved a Polish woman 
suffering from a pathological optical disease.  Having become 
pregnant, the woman was informed by several medical pr ctitioners 
that pregnancy and delivery might cause a serious deterioration in her 
optical condition.  As a consequence, she sought a medical termination 
of pregnancy on the basis of Polish law, which permits abortion when 
pregnancy seriously threatens the health of the woman. 187  
Nevertheless, the doctors refused to grant the woman the health 
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restrictive abortion laws.”). 
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 184 See Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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 185 Tysiąc v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, 2007–I Eur. Ct. H.R.  
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Regimes (2011) (unpublished Master’s thesis), available at 
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 187 See text accompanying note 110. 
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certificate necessary to obtain an abortion in public hospitals.  The 
woman was forced to deliver the baby and, as expected, her conditions 
deteriorated badly, and she became practically blind.188  
The applicant raised a facial challenge against the Polish abortion 
law, arguing that the prohibition on voluntary interruption of 
pregnancy amounted to an interference with her Article 8 ECHR right 
to respect for private life.189  The ECtHR, instead, took the view that 
“the circumstances of the applicant’s case and in particular the nature 
of her complaint [we]re more appropriately examined from the 
standpoint of the respondent State’s . . . positive obligations.”190  
According to the ECtHR, Article 8 ECHR establishes not only a 
negative limit on the power of the state to interfere with the person’s 
physical and psychological integrity, but also “a positive obligation 
[for the state] to secure to its citizens their right to effective respect for 
this integrity.”191  In the case at hand, the national authorities had 
failed to comply with this duty.192 
As highlighted by the ECtHR, the Polish abortion act did allow for 
termination of pregnancy on health grounds, an exception that the 
applicant’s condition should certainly have triggered.  Nevertheless, 
the Polish legislation lacked “any effective mechanisms capable of 
determining whether the conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion had 
been met in [the applicant’s] case.”193  The absence of a clear, time-
sensitive procedure for ascertaining in a fair and independent manner 
whether a woman had a right to interrupt her pregnancy on health 
grounds had a “chilling effect on doctors when deciing whether the 
requirements of legal abortion are met in an individual case.”194  In the 
ECtHR’s view, “once the legislature decides to allow abortion, it must 
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 191 Id. ¶ 107 
 192 On the concepts of  “negative” and  “positive” obligations stemming 
from fundamental rights, see Neuman, supra note 89, at 300; David Currie, Positive 
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 194 Id. ¶116. 
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not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real 
possibilities to obtain it.”195 
The decision of the ECtHR in Tysiąc is “significant because it 
confirms that women’s right to access legal abortions may not be 
illusory.”196  At the same time, in stressing the positive duties hat 
states have in adopting all relevant measures to make legal abortion 
practically available, the ECtHR focused only on the procedural 
aspects of abortion law.  The ECtHR followed the same approach in 
the D. case,197 where it declared the complaint of a woman who could 
not obtain an abortion in Ireland on grounds of fetal impairments as 
inadmissible since the applicant had not explored all of the domestic 
procedural avenues that might have been available to make her claim 
heard, including a constitutional challenge to the Irish Supreme 
Court.198 
From this point of view, the approach of the ECHR judicial branch 
seems far more prudent than that of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe,199 which has recently, albeit in a non-binding form, 
expressed its concern that in many of the contracting states “numerous 
conditions are imposed and restrict the effective access to safe, 
affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services.”200  The 
Parliamentary Assembly explicitly advocates that “abortion should not 
be banned within reasonable gestational limits.”201  Rather, Tysiąc 
indicates “the ECtHR’s unwillingness to address substantive violations 
of abortion rights, even when there is a legal basis for abortion, and 
propensity to rely on procedural violations to remedy the wrong.”202 
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In conclusion, the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the ECtHR 
highlights the increasing impact of supranational law over states’ 
regulations of abortion.203   On the one hand, the ECJwhile 
strategically avoiding a clash with the state authori ies on the human 
rights questions raised by a ban on the circulation of i formation about 
abortion204has clearly affirmed that abortion represents a servic  
within the meaning of EU law and is thus subjected to EU 
supervision.205  On the other hand, the ECtHRwhile falling short of 
recognizing a right to abortion in the penumbras of the ECHR206has 
built up a solid jurisprudential framework, which prohibits states from 
abridging freedom of information about abortion services and requires 
them to ensure adequate procedural mechanisms to make the right to 
abortion, where it exists, effective.207 
From this point of view, a contextual analysis of the national 
abortion regulations and of the law of the EU and the ECHR 
illuminates the complex dynamics that arise in the European 
multilevel constitutional architecture.  Although at this point, it 
appears that there is no direct legal incompatibility between the 
national laws, especially those dictating a restrictive regulation of 
abortion, and the principles established by supranatio l jurisdictions, 
several tensions and challenges shape the interrelationship between 
some national legal systems and the normative order established by the 
EU treaties and the ECHR.208 
Ireland can still prohibit abortion, as EU law does not prevent it 
from doing so.  Nevertheless, EU law requires abortion to be treated as 
a service and demands that Irish people be allowed to seek all services, 
including abortions, overseas and be free to receiv information about 
them.  By the same token, Poland can still prohibit a ortion save on 
health grounds, as ECHR law does not prevent it from d ing so.  Yet if 
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abortion on health ground is permitted, ECHR law requires Poland to 
ensure that adequate and effective procedures are in place to this end.  
To make sense of this complex picture, I suggest employing the 
concept of inconsistency, as a catch-word that well d scribes the 
pressures and frictions emerging from the interplay of distinct bodies 
of laws pushing in opposite directions.209 
Until the 1990s, abortion law was exclusively in the purview of 
national states, with major variations in the choice of regulation 
pursued by the EU countries.  However, also in this field, 
developments in both the framework of the EU and in the ECHR 
system have proven that o quote the famous statement of Koen 
Lenaerts“there is simply no nucleus of sovereignty that the M mber 
States can invoke”210 against the evolution of supranational law.211  
The ECJ and the ECtHR have, step-by-step, developed a series of 
substantive checks and procedural balances that cons rain the freedom 
of the Member States to deal with abortion as they see fit.  This has 
created a web of complexities and inconsistencies.  It i  now necessary 
to investigate whether these dynamics are uniquely European and how 
such phenomena might prospectively develop in the future. 
IV.  THE RIGHT TO ABORTION IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIENCE  
As the previous section has highlighted, a series of pressures and 
complex constitutional tensions characterize the field of abortion 
rights in the European multilevel architecture.  However, these 
inconsistencies are not a peculiarly European phenom n; rather, 
analogous issues arise in other constitutional system  that are 
“premised on regulatory federalism regarding abortion policy.”212  
From a comparative point of view, it seems possible to argue, albeit 
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with several caveats, that the dynamics arising in the field of abortion 
law in Europe are not dissimilar from those at play in those federal 
systems in which different abortion legislations are in force in the 
various constituent states, and in which a federal court must review the 
states’ regulations on the basis of a transnational law protecting 
fundamental rights.213 
As Stephen Gardbaum has convincingly explained, this seems to 
be particularly the case in the United States of America (U.S.).214  
Whereas in other federal systems, such as Canada or Switzerland, 
criminal law and, by implication, the regulation of abortion, is a field 
of federal competence215 and is thus subjected to a uniform federal 
legislation, or lack thereof,216 in the U.S., jurisdiction over criminal 
law and abortion belongs to the constituent states, albeit under 
constraints imposed by the federal government.217   In addition, 
contrary to other federal countries such as Australia, where criminal 
law and, by implication, the regulation of abortion, is also within the 
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competences of the constituent states218 but is essentially addressed in 
a uniform manner,219  the U.S. has historically displayed a wide 
variation in the way in which the several states have regulated abortion 
rights.220 
Therefore, a comparative assessment of the U.S. constitutional 
experience can illuminate the challenges and developments at play in 
the field of abortion law in the European system.221  A number of 
clarifications, however, are necessary.222  The comparison between the 
constitutional dynamics shaping the issue of abortion in the U.S. and 
Europe neither implies that the two systems neither ar  identical nor 
suggests that the two systems will necessarily develop along the same 
lines.  Despite the fact that the EU and the ECHR “have increasingly 
taken on the features of full-blown constitutional structures,”223 there 
are still some significant differences between the European multilevel 
architecture and the U.S. federal system, and many of these 
differences are likely to remain for at least the near future. 
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  As I have argued elsewhere,224 the U.S. federal system and the 
European multilevel architecture share an important structural 
analogy:  they both feature a pluralist constitutional arrangement for 
the protection of fundamental rights in which rights are simultaneously 
recognized at the state and federal / supranational levels and 
adjudicated by a plurality of institutions operating in these multiple 
layers.225   Hence, a comparative assessment of how the U.S. 
constitutional system has dealt with abortion rights issues over time 
raises useful insights for understanding the current European 
challenges.  In addition, this comparison provides some cautionary 
tales that help observers appreciate the possible scenarios that might 
open up in the future in the European multilevel human rights 
system.226 
Abortion laws in the U.S. in the early 1960s closely r sembled the 
European laws of the same time.  During the nineteenth century, all of 
the states of the federation had enacted criminal bans on abortion, with 
the primary aim of protecting the potential mother from the 
abortionist.227  By the turn of the century, however, anti-abortion laws 
had been redrafted with the goal of protecting the fetus rather than 
protecting the woman and had acquired a “symbolic social curb . . . 
[of] women’s autonomy over their own bodies [and] . .  sexual 
relations.”228  The standard format of abortion legislation in U.S. states 
“typically made it a crime for anyone to perform an bortion and also 
usually made it a crime for a woman to obtain one.”229  Most states 
only allowed the termination of pregnancy when strictly necessary to 
save the woman’s life.230 
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By the 1960s, however, pressures had emerged in many st tes to 
change restrictive abortion legislations, either by reforming them or by 
abolishing them.231   In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) 
published its Model Penal Code, which, in reconsidering the entire 
system of U.S. criminal law, also offered a model of reform for 
abortion laws.232  The Code removed the criminal sanctions for the 
performance of an abortion when the medical practitioner certifies that 
“there is substantial risk that continuance of the pr gnancy would 
gravely impair the physical or mental health of themother or that the 
child would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the 
pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious 
intercourse.”233  In the following years, a number of state legislatures 
amended their codes to incorporate the changes sugge ted by the 
ALI. 234  Others adopted even more liberal reforms, allowing abortion 
on demand up to the first trimester or later.235 
Because the reform of state laws proceeded unevenly, however, 
advocates for changes began to mount challenges against restrictive 
abortion laws before the state judiciary.236  For instance, in 1969, the 
California Supreme Court found that the state’s actprohibiting 
abortion, except when necessary to save the woman’s life was 
unconstitutionally vague under the state Constitution.237  Also the 
federal judiciary, however, soon became a forum for legal attacks 
against restrictive state abortion laws. Since the late 1920s, indeed, the 
U.S. Supreme Court had began interpreting the “due process” clause 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 238  to 
“incorporate” parts of the first ten amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, commonly referred to as the Bill of Rights.239 As a result 
of this transformative jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court 
mandated states’ adherence to and protection of many of the 
fundamental rights articulated in the Bill of Rights, and plaintiffs were 
empowered to rely on these rights to challenge state ’ legislations 
before the federal judiciary.240  In the early 1970s, thus, federal district 
and circuit courts began to embrace claims that resrictive state 
abortion laws conflicted with the fundamental rights guarantees 
protected by the U.S. Constitution241 and most specifically with, the 
right to privacy which the Supreme Court had recognized in Griswold 
v. Connecticut.242 
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Needless to say, the eighteenth century Bill of Rights of the U.S. 
Constitutionmuch like the twentieth century fundamental laws of 
the EU Member States, the ECHR, and the EU treatiesdoes not 
contain an explicit, textual protection for the right to an abortion.243  In 
the paramount 1973 Roe v. Wade decision,244 however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the federal Constitution protected an 
unenumerated right to abortion and that state laws prohibiting abortion 
were unconstitutional.245  In Roe, the Supreme Court invalidated an 
old Texas statute, which made abortion a crime in all circumstances.246  
On the same day that the Court delivered its Roe judgment, it also 
struck down, in Doe v. Bolton, 247 another more modern abortion 
statute from Georgia that criminalized abortion except on medical 
grounds.248 
Writing for a seven-to-two majority of the Supreme Court, Justice 
Blackmun stated that the right to privacy was “broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”249 The Court rejected the argument that a woman’s right 
to abortion was absolute; rather, it acknowledged that “some state 
regulation in areas protected by that right is appro riate.”250  Like the 
ECtHR,251 the Court refused to speculate on “the difficult question of 
when life begins.”252  But it unequivocally stated that the fetus could 
not be regarded as a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment in order to justify restrictive states’ anti-abortion 
statutes.253 
In light of this constitutional assessment, the Court developed its 
well-known “trimesters guidelines,” clearly dictating the legitimate 
contours within which a state could regulate abortion:254  
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester [of 
pregnancy], the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the 
medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician; (b) For 
the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the irst trimester, the 
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it 
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably 
related to maternal health.  (c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the 
State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it 
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is 
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life 
or health of the mother.
255
 
The Roe decision generated strong reactions256 and effectively 
transformed the issue of abortion into “the central legal problem” of 
contemporary U.S. constitutional law. 257  Attempts were made at the 
federal level to overrule Roe through the enactment of a human life 
amendment258 and to limit Roe’s impact by prohibiting the financing 
of abortion through federal funds.259  The main responses to the 
decision nevertheless occurred at the state level.260  Indeed, Roe 
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“federalized (rather than nationalized) abortion policy, making state 
legislatures supporting players in abortion policymaking.”261  In many 
states, “legislatures responded to R e by enacting new restrictions that 
attempted to reduce the number of abortions without challenging what 
came to be called Roe’s ‘central premise’that the Constitution 
barred states from making it a criminal offense to have or perform any 
abortion.”262 
Whereas a handful of states enacted statutes that were facially 
incompatible with Roe and thus directly defied the decision of the 
Supreme Court,263  other states passed legislation purporting to 
circumvent the Court’s decision by denying public fnancing for 
abortion and setting strict conditions under which abortions would be 
allowed, such as requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals, 
requiring prior parental and spousal consent, and waiting periods.264  
In a series of decisions in the twenty years following Roe, the Supreme 
Court struck down many such state laws, including:  the imposition of 
spousal consent,265 mandatory waiting periods,266 and the requirement 
that abortions be performed only in hospitals.267  In Bigelow v. 
Virginia,268 the Court struck down a Virginia statute, which, much like 
the Irish ban challenged before the ECJ in Grogan,269 prohibited the 
advertising of abortion providers in other U.S. states.270  
At the same time, the Supreme Court upheld state laws imposing 
women’s informed consent,271 requiring parental notification,272 and 
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foreclosing both state and federal public funding for elective 
abortions.273  In addition, under the influence of newly appointed 
judges and, possibly, under pressure from states’ lgislatures, the 
Court incrementally retracted from Roe’s rigid trimester formula.274  
The reasoning of the Court in Roe had been criticized, from a liberal 
perspective, for overemphasizing the role of medical doctors in the 
decision and failing to address the issue of women’s autonomy and 
equality.275   In contrast, conservative critics found that Roe’s 
prohibition of any state regulation of abortions during the first and 
second trimesters represented an unwarranted interference by the 
federal judicial branch in a matter that should be decided by the state 
legislature, through the states’ democratic processes.276 
This eventually paved the way for the Court’s 1992 decision in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.277  In a plurality opinion jointly written 
by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, the Supreme Court 
upheld Roe’s core holding that “a State may not prohibit any woman 
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before 
viability.” 278   However, it rejected Roe’s trimester framework, 
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replacing it with the “undue burden” test.279  Under this test, a state’s 
regulation of abortion would be regarded as “invalid, if its purpose or 
effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”280 
Applying the undue burden test in Casey, the Supreme Court 
upheld a number of provisions in the Pennsylvania law at issue, 
including the imposition of informed consent and a waiting period for 
women seeking abortions.281  However, the Court struck down the 
spousal notification requirement, arguing that due to the threat of 
violence that a woman might face if she had to inform her partner of 
her decision to seek an abortion,282  the provision represented a 
substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to choose and was comparable, 
for all practical effects, to a proviso “outlaw[ing] abortion in all 
cases.”283  Therefore, it has been argued that C sey saved Roe.284  At 
the same time, however, the Court made clear “that state regulations 
[would] almost invariably pass[] muster,”285 unless they attempted to 
bar abortion tout court.286 
Although it has been argued that Casey somehow “settled the 
abortion dispute, both by establishing a majoritarian, split-the-
difference standards, and perhaps more importantly, by providing a 
template that helps states determine what types of ab rtion regulations 
can be constitutionally pursued,”287 the two decades following the 
decision featured a wide array of activities by both the federal and the 
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state legislatures.288  In 1994, the U.S. Congress enacted its first piece 
of legislation in the field of abortion law, making it a federal crime to 
harass and obstruct lawful providers of abortion.289  In 2003, Congress 
enacted a ban on the performance of abortion throug the “intact dilate 
and extraction” technique (referred to  by its criti s as “partial birth 
abortion”), 290  an act that—despite the existence of a contrary 
precedent,291  federalism concerns,292  and limited legislative 
findings293 —was upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. 
Carhart.294 
At the state level, several scholars have emphasized how states 
were generally uninterested in pushing the boundaries of Casey295 or 
Gonzales by enacting measures that challenged Roe outright.296  
Nevertheless, it appears that in the last twenty years many states have 
enacted increasingly restrictive abortion laws.297  The latest and most 
remarkable example is perhaps represented by South Dakota, which 
recently introduced, for the first time in the U.S., a directive 
counseling requirement, similar to the German model, 298  which 
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obliges women seeking an abortion to consult with pro-life pregnancy 
centers, even if they seek an abortion during the first trimester of 
pregnancy.299  Because of such legislative experimentations, wide 
variations among the states’  approaches to abortion exist today, even 
though all such legislation must take place within the framework of 
permissible limitations set by the Supreme Court.300   The 
contemporary picture of abortion regulation in the states of the U.S. 
highlights a “crazy-quilt pattern of the laws—a diversity that 
resembles the diversity of state law during the ‘reform’ period of the 
late 1960s.”301 
On the one hand, a number of states have passed legislation that 
restricts abortion to the greatest extent permitted by federal law.302  To 
this end, together with more traditional provisions imposing parental 
notification, waiting periods, or informed consent requirements,303 
recent statutory enactments require women to hear about all potential 
medical complications that could arise from an abortion (even those 
complications that are irrelevant in their cases),304 require women to 
hear ultrasounds of the fetus,305 and, as mentioned, undergo directive 
counseling.306  A series of demanding targeted regulations for abrtion 
providers are also in force in several states.307  Finally, whereas the 
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unenforceable pre-Roe statutory prohibitions of abortion remain on 
many states’ statutory books,308 some states have enacted so-called 
trigger laws, which would automatically outlaw aborti n if the 
Supreme Court were to overrule Roe.309 
On the other hand, a number of states have autonomously decided 
to supersede the federal standard by offering even greater 
constitutional protection for the right to an abortion than the federal 
minimum.310  Following the lead of the California Supreme Court,311 
nine state superior courts have concluded that their state constitutions 
contained an independent right to abortion.312  In addition, inferior 
courts in nine other states have recognized a stateconstitutional right 
to abortion or privacy.313  Finally, broad recognition of the right to 
abortion without any major statutory limitations is provided in the 
legislation of many other states with the consequence that, even in the 
unlikely case that the Supreme Court overrules Roe, abortion would be 
lawful in a plurality of U.S. states.314 
In conclusion, the assessment of the U.S. constitutional experience 
in the field of abortion law highlights an evolving pattern.  
Historically, the competence over criminal law belonged to the several 
states and  by the late 1960s, wide variations existed in the ways in 
 
 308 See Fallon, supra note 256, at 255, 614.  
 309 See Matthew Berns, Trigger Laws, 97 GEO. L.J. 1639, 1641–42 (2009). 
 310 On the possibility for state constitutions to offer greater fundamental 
rights protection than the minimum provided by federal law, which is a distinctive 
feature of the U.S. federal system for the protection of fundamental rights, see 
William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); Stewart Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate 
Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 707 (1983).  
 311 See Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 
796 (Cal. 1981) (holding that the right to “procreative choice” under the California 
Constitution is “at least as broad as that described n Roe v. Wade”).  
 312 On the expansive interpretation of state constitutions offered by some 
state courts in the field of abortion law, especially with regard to state funding of 
abortion, see Janice Steinschneider, State Constitutions:  The New Battlefield for 
Abortion Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 284, 284–87 (1987); Linda Vanzi, 
Freedom at Home:  State Constitutions and Medicaid Funding for Abortions, 26 
N.M. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (1996). 
 313 See Gardbaum, supra note 212, at 687. 
 314 See Fallon, supra note 256, at 614 (noting that “many states formally 
repealed their old abortion laws after Roe, [but] seventeen states currently have laws 
on their books that would forbid nearly all abortions.”).  
2011 ROE V. WADE ON THE OTHER SIDE 49 
which each state regulated abortion.  The Supreme Court’s Roe v. 
Wade decision imposed a unifying standard, recognizing a woman’s 
fundamental right to decide privately whether to carry on a pregnancy 
and precluding states from criminalizing abortion. Since that decision, 
however, the Supreme Court has taken a number of retreating steps, 
recognizing wider room for states to maneuver, albeit within the limits 
of the Casey undue burden test.  As a consequence, significant 
differences remain today in the regulation of abortion in the several 
U.S. states, but a woman’s right to terminate her pr gnancy—at least 
during the first trimester of pregnancy—is solidly grounded in the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.315 
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROTECTION OF 
ABORTION RIGHTS IN EUROPE:  THE DECISION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A., B. & C. V. 
IRELAND 
The dynamics at play in the U.S. constitutional system have 
produced over time a more consistent framework for the regulation of 
abortion rights throughout the U.S., while still preserving a degree of 
diversity among the several states.  The U.S. Supreme Court now 
ensures a minimum federal standard of protection for the right to an 
abortion:  states can supersede this standard and integrate it, but they 
cannot place undue burdens that would substantially impair a woman’s 
right to an abortion.  In light of the U.S. experienc , this section 
addresses the question whether a comparable evolution toward the 
definition of a supranational standard for the protection of abortion 
rights can be detected in the most recent transformations taking place 
in the law in the books and the law in action in the European human 
rights system.  To this end, I focus on a recent decision of the ECtHR:  
the December 2010 Grand Chamber ruling in A., B. & C. v. Ireland.316 
The case concerned three women, two Irish citizens a d a 
Lithuanian citizen residing in Ireland, who had to travel to England to 
terminate their pregnancies due to the Irish prohibition on abortion.317  
The first applicant was an unmarried and unemployed woman, who 
already had four children and sought an abortion for reasons of health 
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and well-being and out of a concern that an additional pregnancy 
would make it impossible for her to raise her children.318  The second 
applicant had become pregnant unintentionally and had been initially 
warned that there was a substantial risk of an ectopic pregnancy.  By 
the time she decided to seek an abortion, the risk had been excluded 
but the woman was willing to terminate her pregnancy out of well-
being concerns.319  The third applicant had become pregnant after a 
three-year chemotherapeutic treatment for a rare fom f cancer.  
Although the pregnancy seriously threatened a recurnce of the 
cancer and imperiled her life, the woman was unable to obtain advice 
from Irish doctors on whether she was entitled to an abortion in 
Ireland, and she therefore decided to seek an abortion in England out 
of concern for her life.320 
All of the applicants complained that the Irish prohibition on 
abortion restricted their ECHR rights.321  They maintained that the 
criminalization of abortion violated Article 3, since it produced stigma 
and prejudice against women seeking an abortion, which umiliated 
and degraded their dignity.322  They also claimed that the prohibition 
of abortion was contrary to Article 14, which prohibits discrimination, 
and Article 13, which requires contracting parties to the ECHR to set 
up effective domestic remedies to vindicate their conventional 
rights.323  The third applicant complained that the impossibility of 
obtaining advice as to the medical implications of a pregnancy for her 
cancer also amounted to a violation of Article 2, which enshrines the 
right to life.324  Finally, all the applicants claimed that the Irish 
prohibition of abortion represented an undue interfer nce with their 
right to respect for private life protected by Article 8.325 
The ECtHR began its opinion by explaining the Irish legal 
framework on abortion in great detail and reporting the criticisms and 
proposals for reform that had been discussed both at t e national and 
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international levels.326   It then addressed the admissibility issue, 
distinguishing the present case from the D. case.327  As far as the first 
two petitioners were concerned, the ECtHR stated that they could not 
be required to pursue and exhaust the domestic avenues of recourse 
before applying to the ECtHR as it was clear that a domestic complaint 
alleging a violation of the ECHR due to the impossible nature of 
obtaining an abortion in Ireland for health and well-b ing reasons did 
not have “any prospect of success, going against . . . the history, text 
and judicial interpretation of Article 40.3.3 of the [Irish] 
Constitution.”328  As far as the third petitioner was concerned, the 
ECtHR underlined how the lack of domestic legislation mplementing 
the right to abortion to save the life of the mother was at the core of 
her complaint and therefore had to be addressed on the merits. 
On the substantive issues of the case, the ECtHR summarily 
rejected the claim of a violation of Article 3 ECHR, arguing that the 
“facts alleged d[id] not disclose a level of severity falling within the 
scope” of the contested provision. 329  The Court also rebuffed the third 
applicant’s complaint under Article 2 ECHR because “there was no 
legal impediment to the third applicant travelling for an abortion 
abroad.”330  The ECtHR then moved to address the alleged violation of 
Article 8 ECHR by considering separately the complaint of the first 
two applicants “that they could not obtain an abortion for health and / 
or well-being reasons in Ireland,”331 and later, the complaint of the 
third petitioner “about the absence of any legislative implementation 
of Article 40.3.3 of the [Irish] Constitution.”332  
According to the ECtHR, although Article 8 ECHR could not “be 
interpreted as conferring a right to abortion,”333 its well-consolidated 
case law made it clear that “legislation regulating the interruption of 
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pregnancy touches upon the sphere of the private life of the 
woman,”334 protected by Article 8 ECHR.335  As a consequence:  
[t]he prohibition in Ireland of abortion where sought for reasons of health 
and / or well-being about which the first and second applicants 
complained, and the third applicant’s alleged inability to establish her 
qualification for a lawful abortion in Ireland, come within the scope of 
their right to respect for their private lives and accordingly Article 8.
336  
Nevertheless, the “difference in the substantive complaints of the first 
and second applicants, on the one hand, and that of the third applicant 
on the other, require[d] separate determination of the question whether 
there ha[d]  been a breach of Article 8.”337  
The third applicant’s case raised an issue that had already been 
considered by the ECtHR:  that is, the existence of a series of positive 
obligations stemming from Article 8 ECHR that require the 
contracting parties to set-up an effective legal frmework at the 
domestic level to verify whether the conditions forobtaining a lawful 
abortion had been met.338  In contrast, the first two applicants’ cases 
raised a novel issue:  they presented the ECtHR with the first 
“opportunity to develop certain general Convention principles on the 
minimum degree of protection to which a woman seeking an abortion 
would be entitled”339 and to expound upon the negative obligations 
that limit the authority of the contracting parties to prohibit voluntary 
termination of pregnancy. 
The ECtHR reached different conclusions in the two scenarios, 
agreeing unanimously on a violation of Article 8 ECHR with regard to 
the third applicant but dividing sharply on the complaint of the first 
two applicants.340  In the case of the third applicant, the ECtHR, by 
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drawing heavily on the Tysiąc precedent,341 remarked how Article 8 
ECHR “ may also impose on a State certain positive obligations”342 
and that these obligations may require “the implementation, where 
appropriate, of specific measures in an abortion cotext.”343  The 
ECtHR underlined how, under the X. doctrine of the Irish Supreme 
Court, abortion could be obtained lawfully in Ireland when there was a 
real and substantial risk to the life of the mother—as distinct from the 
health of the mother—and this risk could only be avoided by a 
termination of the pregnancy.344  The ECtHR then noted that the case 
of the third applicant would fit within this category; however, it found 
that no effective mechanisms existed under domestic law to ensure a 
right to an abortion in such life-saving situations.345  The ECtHR noted 
a variety of factors that revealed the ineffectiveness of Irish domestic 
law in ensuring that a woman could access an abortion when necessary 
to save her life. 
First, the ECtHR raised “a number of concerns as to the 
effectiveness of [the medical] consultation procedur  as a means of 
establishing the third applicant’s qualification for a lawful abortion in 
Ireland.”346  The ECtHR emphasized that no legal framework exist d 
“whereby any difference of opinion between the woman and her 
doctor or between different doctors consulted, or whereby an 
understandable hesitancy on the part of a woman or doctor, could be 
examined and resolved.”347  The ECtHR then remarked how the 
existence of severe criminal sanctions for unlawful abortions 
“constitute[s] a significant chilling factor for both women and doctors 
in the medical consultation process.”348 
Second, the ECtHR underlined how a constitutional complaint was 
not a satisfactory means of protecting the third applicant’s right to 
respect for her private life.  Constitutional courts are not “the 
appropriate fora for the primary determination as to whether a woman 
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qualifies for an abortion which is lawfully availabe in a State”349 
because “it would be wrong to turn the High Court into a ‘licensing 
authority’ for abortions.”350   Furthermore, “it would be equally 
inappropriate to require women to take on such complex constitutional 
proceedings when their underlying constitutional right to an abortion 
in the case of a qualifying risk to life was not disputable.”351 
The ECtHR concluded that Ireland had violated Article 8 ECHR 
by failing to provide the third applicant, whose life was at risk due to 
her pregnancy, with adequate procedures by which she could establish 
her right to a lawful abortion in Ireland.  In the ECtHR’s view:  
[t]he uncertainty generated by the lack of legislatve implementation of 
Article 40.3.3 [of the Irish Constitution], and more particularly by the lack 
of effective and accessible procedures to establish a right to an abortion 
under that provision, has resulted in a striking discordance between the 
theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on grounds of a relevant 
risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its practical implementation.
352
  
The ECtHR found that this amounted to a violation of Article 8 
ECHR. 
In contrast, in the case of the first two applicants, eleven judges out 
of seventeen of the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber concluded that Ireland 
had not violated the negative obligations stemming from Article 8 
ECHR, which prohibits contracting parties from interfering with the 
right to respect for private life.  The majority of the ECtHR 
acknowledged that “the prohibition of the termination of the first and 
second applicants’ pregnancies sought for reasons of health and / or 
well-being amounted to an interference with their right to respect for 
their private lives.”353   However, in undertaking the three-tier 
proportionality test, required by Article 8(2) ECHR to verify whether 
the interference was “in accordance with the law,” pursued a 
“legitimate aim,” and was “necessary in a democrati society,”354 the 
ECtHR concluded that the Irish prohibition of abortion did not 
 
 349 Id. ¶ 258. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. ¶ 259. 
 352 Id. ¶ 264. 
 353 Id. ¶ 216. 
 
354  ECHR, Art. 8(2). 
2011 ROE V. WADE ON THE OTHER SIDE 55 
disproportionately interfere with the first and second applicants’ right 
to respect for private life.355 
On the first issue, whether the interference with Article 8 ECHR 
was in accordance with the law, the ECtHR simply recall d its Open 
Door ruling.356  On the second issue, whether the interference pursued 
a legitimate aim, the ECtHR remarked how under Irish law, the right 
to life of the unborn was based “on profound moral values concerning 
the nature of life which were reflected in the stance of the majority of 
the Irish people against abortion during the 1983 referendum and 
which have not been demonstrated to have relevantly changed since 
then.”357  The ECtHR hence affirmed “that the impugned restriction . . 
. pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of morals.”358  Finally, 
on the third and most relevant question, whether th interference with 
Article 8 ECHR was necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR 
clarified that in the present case, it had to “examine whether the 
prohibition of abortion in Ireland for health and / or well-being reasons 
struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the first and second 
applicants’ right to respect for their private lives under Article 8 and, 
on the other hand, profound moral values of the Irish people.”359  
Given “the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by 
the question of abortion,”360 however, the ECtHR decided that Ireland 
enjoyed a “broad margin of appreciation”361 in determining whether a 
fair balance was struck between the two conflicting values.362 
The ECtHR also examined “whether this wide margin of 
appreciation is narrowed by the existence of a relevant consensus” 
among the other European states and, significantly, underlined how “a 
substantial majority of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe 
. . . allow[] abortion on broader grounds than accorded under Irish 
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law.”363  In the factual part of the decision, the ECtHR had already 
remarked how: 
Abortion is available on request (according to certain criteria including gestational limits) 
in some 30 Contracting States.  An abortion justified on health grounds is available in 
some 40 Contracting States and justified on well-being grounds in some 35 such States.  
Three Contracting States prohibit abortion in all circumstances (Andorra, Malta and San 
Marino).  In recent years, certain States have extended the grounds on which abortion can 
be obtained (Monaco, Montenegro, Portugal and Spain).364 
Despite the existence of a clear European trend in favor of the 
legalization of abortion,365 the majority of the ECtHR denied that “this 
consensus decisively narrow[ed] the broad margin of appreciation of 
the State.”366  To justify this conclusion, the ECtHR affirmed tha  
there was no agreement on the “scientific and legal definition of the 
beginning of life”367 and that “this consensus [could] not be a decisive 
factor in the Court’s examination of whether the impugned prohibition 
on abortion in Ireland for health and well-being reasons struck a fair 
balance between the conflicting rights and interests, notwithstanding 
an evolutive interpretation of the Convention.”368  
Therefore, the ECtHR denied “that the prohibition in Ireland of 
abortion for health and well-being reasons, based as it is on the 
profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life . . . 
and as to the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life 
of the unborn, exceed[ed] the margin of appreciation accorded in that 
respect to the Irish State.”369  In addition, the ECtHR mentioned in 
passing how Irish women still had “the option of lawfully travelling to 
another State”370 to seek an abortion and to receive information about 
abortion services overseas (without considering, however, the 
discriminatory effects that this possibility has onhigh-income and 
low-income women).371  The ECtHR thus concluded that there had 
been no violation of Article 8 ECHR as regards the first and second 
applicants. 
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The decision of the majority of the ECtHR prompted a vigorous 
dissent by six judges.  In a joint opinion, the minor ty disagreed with 
the majority’s finding that Ireland had not violated Article 8 ECHR 
with regard to the first and second applicants and blamed the majority 
for:  
[I]nappropriately conflat[ing] . . . the question of the beginning of life 
(and, as a consequence, the right to life), the States’ margin of 
appreciation in this regard, with the margin of appreciation that States 
have in weighing the right to life of the fetus against the right to life of the 
mother or her right to health and well-being.
372
 
Rather, the dissenting judges argued that the court should consider 
two elements when applying the proportionality test. 
The first element considered was the existence of a“clear . . . 
consensus amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting States of 
the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion.”373  According to 
the dissenting judges, the precedents of the ECtHR demonstrated that, 
whenever a consensus existed, this “decisively narrow[ed] the margin 
of appreciation” given to the Member States.374  As the dissent’s 
opinion emphasized: 
[T]his approach is commensurate with the ‘harmonising’ role of the 
Convention’s case-law:  indeed, one of the paramount f ctions of the 
case-law is to gradually create a harmonious application of human rights 
protection, cutting across the national boundaries of the Contracting States 
and allowing the individuals within their jurisdiction to enjoy, without 
discrimination, equal protection regardless of their place of residence.
375 
Given the existence of a “strong” consensus in the case at hand, 376 
according to the dissenting judges, the decision of the ECtHR to 
refrain from narrowing the margin of appreciation granted to Ireland 
out of concern for the profound moral values of theIrish people 
amounted to a “real and dangerous” disregard of establi hed 
precedents. 377  Indeed, in the dissent’s view, it is only when no
European consensus exists that the ECtHR should “refrain[] from 
playing its harmonising role, preferring not to become the first 
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European body to ‘legislate’ on a matter still undeci d at European 
level.”378  The second element that, according to the dissenting judges, 
the court should consider when applying the proportionality test was 
the “striking” 379  severity of “the (rather archaic) law,”380  which 
punished abortion in Ireland with the sentence of life imprisonment.381  
The dissenting judges concluded that it was “clear that in the 
circumstances of the case there has been a violation of Article 8 with 
regard to the first two applicants.”382 
In conclusion, the analysis of A., B. & C. v. Ireland reveals that the 
ECtHR has fallen short of bringing Europe along the path set forth by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.383  The ECtHR found a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR as far as the third applicant was 
concerned because Ireland had breached its positive obligations to set 
up an adequate domestic legal framework by which the petitioner 
could establish her right to a lawful abortion for life-saving purposes.  
However, a majority of the ECtHR concluded that the Irish prohibition 
of abortion on health and well-being grounds did not amount to a 
disproportionate interference with the first and second applicants’ 
rights to respect for private life.  Yet, although the ECtHR has not 
delivered a decision analogous to R e v. Wade, it is difficult to predict 
what the consequences of the ruling will be, both for the Member 
States and the future case law of the ECtHR.384 
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Indeed, in May 2011, the Fourth Section of the ECtHR delivered 
another innovative abortion decision that, widely quoting A., B. & C. 
v. Ireland, marked a further step toward the protection of the right to 
an abortion at the supranational level in Europe.  The case, R.R. v. 
Poland,385 concerned a Polish woman who, although she was informed 
since the early days of pregnancy that her fetus might be affected by a 
serious genetic disease, was not able to obtain the medical test needed 
to ascertain the impairment of the fetus and eventually delivered a 
baby affected by the Turner syndrome.  In her application to the 
ECtHR, the woman complained that it was impossible for her to obtain 
timely prenatal tests because the medical doctors with hom she 
consulted had intentionally postponed all genetic examinations.  
Because of these deliberate medical delays, therefor , the woman was 
unable to obtain an abortion within the time limits provided by the 
law, which permits termination of pregnancy within the first twenty-
four weeks for reasons of fetal impairment.386 
In its decision, the ECtHR ruled that Poland had violated Article 8 
ECHR.  By recalling its precedents, the ECtHR remarked that “[w]hile 
a broad margin of appreciation is accorded to the State as regards the 
circumstances in which an abortion will be permitted in a State, once 
that decision is taken the legal framework devised for this purpose 
should be ‘shaped in a coherent manner.’”387  The ECtHR emphasized 
the “critical importance”388 of the time factor in a woman’s decision to 
terminate a pregnancy and underlined how it had “not been 
demonstrated that Polish law as applied to the applicant’s case 
contained any effective mechanisms which would have enabled the 
applicant to seek access to a diagnostic service, decisive for the 
possibility of exercising her right to take an informed decision as to 
whether to seek an abortion or not.”389  It thus concluded that the 
Polish authorities had “failed to comply with their positive obligations 
to secure to the applicant effective respect for her private life and that 
there ha[d] therefore been a breach of Article 8.”390 
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In an unprecedented move, however, the ECtHR also found Poland 
in violation of Article 3 ECHR, which sets up an absolute prohibition 
against torture and inhumane and degrading treatments.  In the 
ECtHR’s view, “ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity 
if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3.”391  However, the 
circumstances of the case unequivocally led to the conclusion that this 
minimum threshold of severity had been passed.  The ECtHR noted 
that the applicant had “tried, repeatedly and with perseverance, 
through numerous visits to doctors and through her written requests 
and complaints, to obtain access to genetic tests which would have 
provided her with information confirming or dispelling her fears; to no 
avail.”392  In addition, it emphasized how the applicant “was in a 
situation of great vulnerability.  Like any other pregnant woman in her 
situation, she was deeply distressed by information that the fetus could 
be affected with some malformation.”393     
As the ECtHR explained, however, although the woman “suffered 
acute anguish . . . [h]er concerns were not properly acknowledged and 
addressed by the health professionals dealing with her case . . . [who 
showed no regard for] the temporal aspect of the applicant’s 
predicament.”394  Because of the deliberate delay by the medical 
doctors, the woman “obtained the results of the tests when it was 
already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to 
continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to legal abortion as the 
time limit provided for by [the Polish Abortion Act] had already 
expired.”395  In light of the conduct of the public authorities, the 
ECtHR expressed its “regret that the applicant was so habbily treated 
by the doctors dealing with her case” and concluded that the 
humiliation suffered by the woman and the impossibility of availing 
herself of a lawful abortion on fetal impairment grounds amounted to a 
violation of Article 3. 396 
In the end, the R.R. v. Poland decision finding a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR in the Polish abortion context, suggests that the Grand 
Chamber ruling in A., B. & C.  v. Ireland is not an obstacle for further 
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judicial developments and greater supranational protecti n of the 
dignity of women in the field of abortion rights.  In addition, the R.R. 
v. Poland decision predicts that the complex questions of balancing 
state sovereignty and women’s autonomy will remain a core feature of 
the ECtHR case law in the years to come.397  At the same, whether the 
creation of a more consistent framework for the regulation of abortion 
rights in Europe remains a possible scenario will also depend on 
transformations taking place in the EU constitutional system. 
VI.  THE LISBON TREATY AND THE EU CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:  FROM HARD TO SOFT PLURALISM 
IN THE EUROPEAN ABORTION REGIME? 
The Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on December 1, 2009,398 has 
significantly reshaped the EU human rights architecture and its 
connection with the systems for the protection of fundamental rights 
established at the national and international levels.399  The Lisbon 
Treaty rescued most of the substantive and institutional innovations 
contained in the abandoned 2003 Constitutional Treaty and can 
therefore be regarded as a momentous reform of the EU constitutional 
 
 397 See Elizabeth Wicks, A., B. & C. v. Ireland:  Abortion Law Under the 
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EUROPEO [THE NEW EUROPEAN TREATY] 178 (2007); Michael Dougan, The Treaty 
of Lisbon 2007:  Winning Minds, Not Hearts, 45 COMMON MKT L. REV. 617 (2008). 
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system.400  Its potential impact on the protection of fundamental rights 
and on the controversial issue of the right to an abortion needs to be 
considered.  The Lisbon Treaty has provided the legal basis for the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR, paving the way for external 
supervision by the ECtHR on the human rights conduct of the EU.401 
In addition, pursuant to the new Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty 
(TEU), the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR),402 which was only 
proclaimed in 2001 by the EU institutions, has now acquired the 
“same legal value” as the other EU treaties (that is, the formal status of 
EU constitutional law).403  The CFR is the first written EU Bill of 
Rights404  and was initially conceived as a codification of the 
fundamental rights recognized by the ECJ.  The CFR, however, 
contains a complete and coherent catalogue of rights that extends well 
beyond a mere jurisprudential restatement; rather, it features one of the 
most advanced human rights instruments worldwide.405  Hence the 
CFR includes a number of provisions that are relevant to the issue of 
abortion including, safeguarding a right to life,406 protecting private 
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life 407  and recognizing a general principle of equality without 
discrimination.408 
The CFR binds all the EU institutions and the Member States 
when they act within the scope of application of EUlaw.409  Since the 
ECJ had already acknowledged in Grogan that abortion constituted a 
service within the meaning of EU law,410 it would appear that any 
national regulation on abortion would fall within the scope of 
application of EU law and would thus be subject to compliance with 
the fundamental rights principles contained in the CFR.411  At the 
same time, whereas in the early 1990s, in the Grogan case, the ECJ 
was able to get around the Irish domestic ban on information about 
abortion services on purely economic grounds,412 it would seem that 
today, given the binding nature of the CFR, any possible challenge to a 
national measure restricting abortion would inevitably require the ECJ 
to consider the human rights issues involved in the case.  This clearly 
shifts the theoretical underpinnings of the ECJ’s oversight from an 
internal market paradigm toward a fundamental rights paradigm.413 
The potential for the above scenario to take place in the abstract 
seems to be confirmed by the legal safeguards that a few EU Member 
States have adopted to prevent such a future developm nt.414  Protocol 
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No. 30 on the Application of the CFR,415 which Poland and the U.K. 
secured from the other EU Member States during the negotiations of 
the Lisbon Treaty, represents the first piece of evidence in this 
regard.416  The Protocol is attached to the EU treaties and has t eir 
same legal status.  It affirms that the CFR “does not extend the ability 
of the [ECJ], or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the [U.K.], to find 
that the laws, regulations or administrative provision , practices or 
action of Poland or of the [U.K.] are inconsistent with the fundamental 
rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.”417 
The U.K. and Poland sought the adoption of the Protocol in order 
to limit the impact of the CFR upon their national legal systems.  For 
the U.K., its support of the Protocol did not stem from a concern for its 
permissive abortion law, but, rather, out of fear that the social rights 
provisions of the CFR could destabilize its labor market.418   In 
contrast, Poland primarily viewed the Protocol as a leg l instrument to 
shield its restrictive abortion regulation from EU supervision.419  This 
is confirmed by the non-binding unilateral declaration No. 61 in which 
Poland makes further efforts to affirm its position that the CFR “does 
not affect in any way the right of Member States to legislate in the 
sphere of public morality, family law, as well as the protection of 
human dignity and respect for human physical and moral integrity.”420   
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The redundancy with which the treaties affirm that the CFR does 
not extend the competences of the EU provides additional evidence of 
several Member States’ concerns when considering a binding CFR; 
namely, its possible spill-over into the domestic legal systems through 
the human rights adjudication of both the ECJ and the national 
courts.421  This same idea is restated multiple times, including in 
Article 6(1)(2) TEU, in Article 51(2) of the CFR itself, in the joint 
non-binding declaration No. 1 of the EU Member States annexed to 
the EU treaties,422 and in the unilateral declaration No. 53 by the 
Czech Republic on the CFR.423  In light of the Grogan case, it is 
uncertain whether these provisions will effectively prevent the ECJ 
from ruling on a new abortion case.424  Still, importantly, the EU 
treaties contain other ad hoc clauses designed to protect specific 
national abortion laws.425     
For example, in its 2003 accession agreement to the EU, Malta 
obtained a special provision, Protocol No. 7, which leaves unaffected 
“the application in the territory of Malta of national legislation relating 
to abortion.”426  Moreover, the consolidated version of the EU treaties 
post-Lisbon has preserved the 1992 Irish protocol (renumbering it as 
Protocol No. 35),427 ensuring that “nothing in the [EU treaties] shall 
affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of 
Ireland.” 428   The December 2008 Conclusions adopted by the 
European Council after the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the first 
Irish referendum of 2008 and paving the way to the second, 
successful, Irish referendum in 2009,429  provided an additional 
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“guarantee that the provisions of the Irish Constitution in relation to 
the right to life . . . and the family are not in ay way affected by the 
fact that the Treaty of Lisbon attributes legal status to the [CFR].”430  
Legal scholars debate whether these provisions of the EU treaties 
can be truly effective.431   Contrary to the purely political declarations, 
the additional Protocols have the same legal value as the EU treaties; 
however, scholars have argued that, for instance, Protocol No. 30 “is 
totally useless: it can not prohibit lawyers from requesting the 
application of the rights codified in the CFR.”432  In addition, if one 
considers that Protocol No. 30 purportedly only aims to “clarify the 
application of the [CFR] in relation to the laws and administrative 
actions of Poland and the [U.K.] and of its justiciability within Poland 
and the [U.K.],”433 it would seem that its effect is not to opt-out from 
the CFR.434  Rather, Protocol No. 30 “is an exercise in smoke and
mirrors,” largely motivated for presentational reason . 435 
At the same time, the concessions granted in the Irish and Maltese 
abortion protocols, as well as the political reassurances that the 
European Council made to Ireland after the first unsuccessful 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, reveal a pattern.  These concessions 
reflect a trend to accommodate in the EU treaties “the distrust of 
several states toward the EU”436 and its human rights instruments.  In 
this context, it is not easy to imagine that the ECJ will, in practice, 
fully incorporate the fundamental rights guarantees included in the 
CFR within the legal systems of the Member States, along the lines 
pursued by the U.S. Supreme Court in its gradual incorporation of the 
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Bill of Rights into the legal systems of the states.437  Nor is it easy to 
imagine that the ECJ will inaugurate a review of domestic legislation 
limiting abortion rights for its compatibility with the transnational 
human rights standard enshrined in the CFR at any time in the near 
future.438 
Still, as Miguel Poiares Maduro has persuasively argued, the CFR 
has a double constitutional life.439  On the one hand, the CFR is 
regarded as “a simple consolidation of the previous fundamental rights 
acquis aimed at guaranteeing regime legitimacy.”440  On the other 
hand, the CFR can be seen as “a bill of rights of a political community, 
a constitutional document that is part of a complete political contract 
among citizens and that therefore legitimises new claims and an 
increased incorporation at the state level.”441  At the moment, it is 
impossible to predict which of these two visions will prevail.  Yet, the 
U.S. experience with its Bill of Rights demonstrates hat “intentions 
and outcomes may differ greatly.”442  Nothing precludes the CFR from 
becoming a powerful federalizing element that sets the minimum 
human rights standard with which states shall comply “to an extent 
that the Union can actually function.”443 
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De jure condendo, a similar development may even be advisable in 
the field of abortion rights on the basis of an equality argument.  I do 
not intend to articulate here a complete normative theory of equality as 
a justification for protecting the right to abortion in Europe, 
comparable to the claims made by a number of distinguished U.S. 
scholars in favor of grounding the central premise of Roe v. Wade in 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendt of the U.S. 
Constitution.444  What I want to briefly suggest, however, is that in the 
European context too, the regulation of abortion raises a number of 
equality concerns.445  In fact, in a multilevel constitutional system, 
states’ bans on abortion can produce discriminatory effects that are 
hard to accept. 
In the previous sections, I explained how a minority of EU 
Member States, notably Ireland, Poland, and Malta, have enacted 
extremely restrictive abortion laws, prohibiting women from obtaining 
an abortion at home except when necessary to save their lives or 
protect against grave injury their health.446  At the same time, women 
residing in these states have a right—protected under EU law, ECHR 
law, and now often also codified under domestic law—to be informed 
about abortion providers in other EU countries.  In addition, women in 
these countries have the right to travel abroad if they want to terminate 
their pregnancies.447  Women are able to exercise these rights without 
facing any risk of prosecution or subjection to thesevere domestic 
criminal sanctions against abortion.448  
 
 444 See Regan, supra note 286, at 1569; Ginsburg, supra note 286, at 385; 
Siegel, supra note 298, at 1694. 
 445 See RONALD DWORKIN, What the Constitution Says, in  FREEDOM’S 
LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 110 (1996) 
(providing a liberal jurisprudential statement that the right to abortion is linked to a 
“moral reading” of the constitutional principles of liberty and equality).  But see 
Dworkin, supra note 22 (grounding the right to procreative autonomy in the 
constitutional principle of freedom of religion).  
 446 See supra Section 1. 
 447 See supra Section 2. 
 448 See Abigail-Mary Sterling, The European Union and Abortion 
Tourism: Liberalizing Ireland’s Abortion Law, 20 B.C. INT'L &  COMP. L. REV. 385, 
385 (1997).  For a comparative perspective, see generally Seth Kreimer, The Law of 
Choice and the Choice of Law:  Abortion, the Right to Travel and Extraterritorial 
Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992).  
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The possibility for a woman to escape the restrictive domestic 
abortion bans by going abroad and to avoid prosecution in her home 
state has shaped the jurisprudence of the European supranational 
courts.449  In fact, this go-around is precisely what prompted AG Van 
Gerven in Grogan to conclude that the Irish ban on information about 
abortion services was not disproportionate.450  In his opinion, AG Van 
Gerven clearly affirmed that “a ban on pregnant women going abroad 
or a rule under which they would be subjected to unsolicited 
examinations upon their return from abroad”451  would never be 
tolerated under EU law.  Furthermore, the ECtHR cited the fact that 
the Irish law granted women the ability to opt-out f the abortion ban 
by “lawfully travelling to another State”452 as one of the justifications 
for its ruling in A., B. & C. v. Ireland.453 
The consequence of all this is that the Irish, Polish and Maltese 
abortion domestic bans, along with their equivalents, effectively 
constrain only those women who cannot side-step the national 
prohibition by travelling to another EU state.454  In other words, these 
 
 449 Indeed, it could even be argued that because women theoretically can 
get out of restrictive bans on abortion by leaving their home countries for the 
abortion, the European supranational courts are more protective of the Member 
States’ autonomy to ban abortions since, viewed from one perspective, this ban is 
not absolute. 
 450 See Opinion of. Advocate Gen. Van Gerven, June 11, 1991, Case C-
159/90, Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan, [1990] E.C.R. I–
4703, 4732, ¶29. 
 451 Id. 
 452 A., B. and C. v. Ireland, [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 203. 
 453 See supra text accompanying note 371. 
 454 See Cook & Dickens, supra note 24, at 59 (describing the socially 
discriminatory impact that abortion bans produce).  See also Eur. Parl. Ass., 
Resolution 1607 (Apr. 16, 2008), at § 4, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta08/ERES1607.ht
m. (remarking that “a ban on abortions does not result in fewer abortions but mainly 
leads to clandestine abortions, which are more traumatic and increase maternal 
mortality and/or lead to abortion ‘tourism’ which is costly, and delays the timing of 
an abortion and results in social inequities”).  The discriminatory effects that are 
produced by an abortion ban have also been highlighted by the report of the EU 
NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SITUATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES (2005) available at 
http://cridho.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/documents/Download.Rep/ orts2004/En.synth.rep_20
04.pdf (stating that “[a] woman seeking abortion should not be obliged to travel 
abroad to obtain it, because of the lack of available services in her home country 
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laws only prohibit abortion to those women who do nt possess 
sufficient private economic resources to leave their countries to 
terminate a pregnancy.  This situation is clearly discriminatory, as the 
undue burden of an unwanted pregnancy is only imposed on low-
income women.455   
Nevertheless, in its argument before the ECtHR in A., B. & C. v. 
Ireland, the Irish government, while openly acknowledging that in 
2007 at least 4,686 women travelled to the U.K. to have an abortion,456 
it still resolutely argued that Ireland’s high protection of the unborn 
child’s right to life justified a domestic prohibition on abortion.457  In 
the same case, the majority of the ECtHR did not address whether the 
Irish abortion ban was compatible with the non-discrimination clause 
of the ECHR.  The Grand Chamber majority laconically stated that: 
[Although] it may even be the case . . . that the impugned prohibition on 
abortion is to a large extent ineffective in protecting the unborn in the 
sense that a substantial number of women take the option open to them in 
law of travelling abroad for an abortion not available in Ireland . . . it is 




even where it would be legal for her to seek abortion, or because, although legal 
when performed abroad, abortion in identical circumstances is prohibited in the 
country of residence. This may be the source of discrimination between women who 
may travel abroad and those who, because of a disability, their state of health, the 
lack of resources, their administrative situation, r even the lack of adequate 
information may not do so”).  For further data concerning the number of women 
travelling abroad to seek abortion, see Mark Hennessy, Money Plays Ever Increasing 
Role in Decisions of Irish Women to Travel, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010; Steve 
Clements & Roger Ingham, Improving Knowledge Regarding Abortions Performed 
on Irish Women in the U.K., CRISIS PREGNANCY AGENCY REPORT NO. 19 (2007) 
available at 
http://www.crisispregnancy.ie/pub/CPA%20Abortion%20Trends%2019.pdf ; ASTRA 
NETWORK, REPRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH SUPPLIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE (2009), available at 
http://www.astra.org.pl/PAI%20astra%20report%202009.pdf; U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., The Third Periodic Report  on Ireland, Jul. 30, 2008, §13, 
CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3 (2008); U.N. Human Rights Comm., The Concluding 
Observation on Poland, Dec. 2, 2004, § 8 CCPR/CO/82/POL (2004). 
 455 For the argument that laws forbidding abortion require women to 
behave as Samaritans, see Regan, supra note 286, at 1569. 
 456 A., B. and C., [2010] Eur. Ct. H. R. 2032, ¶ 183. 
 457 Id. ¶ 185. 
 458 Id. ¶ 239. 
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Yet a legal regime that discriminates between women by making 
abortion possible and lawful only for the women that c n financially 
afford it and making it impossible and unlawful forthe poor, conflicts 
with the principles of equality that should govern any liberal 
democratic constitutional system.459  From this point of view, Article 
21 of the CFR codifies a general principle of equality in the EU basic 
laws for the first time and expressly prohibits any discrimination on 
grounds of property.460   De lege ferenda, therefore, it might be 
desirable for the ECJ, in cooperation with the national courts, to take 
the appropriate steps to enforce this fundamental gu rantee of the CFR 
if necessary also by quashing national abortion legislations that 
discriminately impact low-income women.461 
Needless to say, because of the previously mentioned legal 
constraints on the application of the CFR, the scenario I am depicting 
is not likely to occur in the near future.  In any case, a ruling by the 
ECJ that national bans on abortion violate the CFR would likely raise 
a loud public reaction, equivalent to that following Roe v. Wade:  the 
decision would be welcomed by some and demonized by others.  From 
a purely normative point of view, however, a judicial opinion stating 
that statutes prohibiting abortion are incompatible with the EU’s non-
discrimination principle would simply be the acknowledgment that 
restrictive domestic rules having a disparate impact on rich and poor 
women can no longer be acceptable in an “ever closer Union.”   
In conclusion, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty represents 
a potential turning point for the protection of fundamental rights in the 
 
 459 See DWORKIN, supra note 448, at 27.  
 460 On the principle of equality in the post-CFR EU constitutional system, 
see Paolo Caretti, L’uguaglianza: da segno distintivo dello Stato costituzionale a 
principio generale dell’ordinamento comunitario [Equality:  From Distinctive Mark 
of the Constitutional State To General Principle of Community Law], in LO STATO 
COSTITUZIONALE 513 (Paolo Caretti & Maria Cristina Grisolia eds., 2010); Dimitry 
Kochenov, Citizenship Without Respect:  The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal, JEAN 
MONNET WORKING PAPER NO. 8 (2010).  
 461 On the inescapable role that the judiciary plays in addressing the moral 
issues involved with abortion and to remedy inequalities, see Susanna Mancini & 
Michel Rosenfeld, The Judge as a Moral Arbiter? The Case of Abortion, n 
CONSTITUTIONAL TOPOGRAPHY:  VALUES AND CONSTITUTIONS (Andras Sajo & 
Renata Uitz eds., 2011 forthcoming); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:  
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 
(2007).  
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EU constitutional system.  As the CFR, in particular, has acquired 
binding legal value, the EU will now be endowed with a 
comprehensive and advanced Bill of rights on the basis of which 
actions by the supranational institutions and the Member States that 
fall within the scope of application of EU law may be reviewed.462  
Nevertheless, whether this transformation will have  major impact on 
the domestic legal systems of the EU countries remains to be seen.  
Some states have inserted a number of legal caveats and reservations 
into the EU treaties in order to prevent the ECJ and the national courts 
from consistently making use of the CFR to review national laws, 
including abortion laws.463  
As things stand now, the European abortion regime refl cts what 
may be called a system of “hard pluralism.”464  Despite the existence 
of a growing consensus among the EU Member States in favor of 
legalizing abortion, relevant regulatory differences persist among EU 
countries.  The rise of supranational law through the case law of the 
ECJ and the ECtHR has placed growing constraints upon and new 
challenges for the regulatory autonomy of the Member States, but has 
not reached the point of prohibiting states from maintaining restrictive 
abortion laws.  Thus, while the possibility for pregnant women to 
travel from one state to another to seek terminatio of pregnancy is 
solidly grounded in the fabric of both EU and ECHR law, no 
 
 462 See Lawson, supra note 416, at 36; Cartabia, supra note 402, at 103. 
 463 See Barnard, supra note 419, at 283; Amedeo, supra note 419, at 720. 
 464 I borrow the terms “hard” and “soft” pluralism from Mark Rosen, 
“Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism? Positive, Normative, and Institutional Considerations 
of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 713 (2007), who uses them 
to describe two alternative visions of federalism in the context of U.S. abortion laws.  
Note, however, that I use the expressions ”hard” an “soft” pluralism differently. To 
begin with, whereas he describes a system of “hard pluralism” as a federal 
arrangement (e.g. the one that, in his opinion, would exist in the U.S. if Roe v. Wade 
were overruled) in which any constituent state of the federation can enforce its 
abortion ban extra-territorially (e.g. prohibiting its citizen from travelling abroad for 
an abortion), I instead regard “hard pluralism” as the abortion regime currently in 
force in Europe.  Therefore, for my purposes, “hard pluralism” refers to a regime 
where states can enact abortion ban ut cannot enforce them extraterritorially 
because of the constraints of supranational laws.  The European arrangement that I 
describe would be a system of “soft pluralism” in Rosen’s terminology.  In addition, 
whereas Rosen advocates for a system of “hard pluralism,” I am convinced that “soft 
pluralism’ would be more appropriate in the European multilevel system.  
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minimum transnational standard for protecting abortion rights is 
enforced throughout Europe. 
Yet, from a normative standpoint, the existence of strict national 
abortion bans in a multilevel system in which resourceful women can 
evade the domestic restrictions by travelling to other EU states has 
discriminatory effects that undermine the principle of equality.  In this 
situation, if the ECJ, in cooperation with national courts and under the 
CFR, were to review the most restrictive domestic abortion laws, it 
could foster the establishment of a less discriminatory legal regime.  
Such a regime may be called a system of “soft pluralism.”  Under this 
framework, a woman’s right to an elective abortion, at least in the 
early phase of pregnancy, would be recognized at the supranational 
level, while states would still be free to integrate (or qualify or 
supersede, but not impair) this supranational standard to reflect their 
domestic policy preferences. 
Indeed, as the United States’ experience with abortion rights 
shows, the imposition of a uniform transnational stndard that does not 
allow for any local variation is bound to fail in a federal union that is 
premised upon states maintaining a degree of autonomy.465  At the 
same time, a minimum standard across the federal / multilevel 
architecture to protect a woman’s right to choose wh ther to terminate 
her pregnancy appears to be a necessary condition to avoid 
discrimination and to ensure “a single and comprehensiv  vision of 
justice” for all members of the polity. 466  Whether the European 
abortion regime will evolve from a system of hard pluralism to one of 
soft pluralism, however, depends on the future roleof the CFR and “its 
potential for polity building in the EU.”467   
 
 465 See Daniel Elazar, Federalism, Diversity and Rights, in FEDERALISM 
AND RIGHTS 1 (Ellis Katz & Alan Tarr eds., 1996); Eric Stein, Uniformity and 
Diversity in a Divided-Power System: the United States’ Experience, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 1081 (1986),  now reprinted in  THOUGHTS FROM A BRIDGE: A  RETROSPECTIVE 
OF WRITINGS ON NEW EUROPE AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 309 (2000). 
 466 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 134 (1986). 
 467 See Poiares Maduro, supra note 414, at 292. Incidentally, it may be 
noticed that the considerations developed here with reference to Europe and the 
discriminatory effects that strict state abortion laws can produce in a federal system 
can be applied, ceteris paribus, to the U.S.  For a discussion of these issues in an 
hypothetical post-Roe scenario, see Fallon, supra note 255, especially at 647. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
At the dawn of the second decade of the twenty-first century, 
abortion and reproductive rights continue to remain extremely 
controversial topics on both sides of the Atlantic.  In early April 2011 
in the U.S., conservative opposition toward the allocation of federal 
funds to abortion providers almost derailed the difficult budget deal 
reached between Congress and the President and threatened to shut 
down the federal government.468  Simultaneously in Europe, major 
protests accompanied the enactment by the Hungarian nationalist 
government of the new Constitution, which now includes a provision 
to protect embryonic and fetal life “from the moment of 
conception,”469 a measure that critics describe as contrasting with EU 
fundamental rights and European constitutional values.470  At the same 
time, as Ireland’s continuing difficulties in implem nting the ECtHR 
ruling indicate, nothing suggests that the heated constitutional debates 
over abortion are likely to scale down in the near future. 471 
This Article has analyzed the implications that arise in the field of 
abortion law from the complex interaction among national and 
supranational laws in Europe.  Section 1 surveyed th  main regulatory 
models that emerge from the states’ legislation and practice in the field 
of abortion law.  It underlined the growing trend in favor of the 
protection of a right to voluntary termination of pregnancy in Europe 
and the exceptions to this consensus, reflected in the strong 
disapproval of abortion in the laws of countries such as Ireland, Malta, 
and Poland.  Section 2 examined the rising impact of EU and ECHR 
law in the field of abortion law and explained how the case law of the 
ECJ and the ECtHR has incrementally produced a set of substantive 
checks and procedural balances on the autonomy of the Member States 
in the regulation of abortion. 
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I have argued that the overlap between domestic and tr snational 
norms in the European multilevel architecture generates new 
challenges and inconsistencies in the field of abortion law.  Section 3, 
however, made it clear that the constitutional dynamics at play in the 
European multilevel system are not unique.  Indeed, a comparative 
assessment highlights that a number of tensions have lso 
characterized the U.S. constitutional experience with abortion law.  
While states’ laws differed in the early 1970s, the Roe v. Wade 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court established a feeral constitutional 
right for women to interrupt their pregnancies.  The recognition of a 
federal minimum standard for the protection of the right to an 
abortion, however, has not prevented the states from further 
intervening in the field and, as a result, a plurality of regulatory 
models are still in place today throughout the U.S. 
Whether the recent developments occurring in the European 
multilevel architecture point toward an analogous evolution is unclear.  
Section 4 examined the recent Grand Chamber decision of the ECtHR 
in A., B. & C. v. Ireland and explained why the ruling cannot be fully 
regarded as Europe’s equivalent to Roe v. Wade.  The ECtHR 
unanimously ruled that Ireland had violated the ECHR for failing to 
provide an adequate legal framework by which a woman whose life 
was in peril due to her pregnancy could establish her right to an 
abortion in Ireland.  At the same time, however, a m jority of the 
ECtHR rejected the facial challenge against the Irish abortion ban, 
recognizing, despite the growing European pro-choice consensus, a 
margin of appreciation to the ECHR contracting parties in the field of 
abortion law. 
Section 5 assessed the CFR and the alternative scenarios that 
opened up in the EU constitutional system after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty.  A number of legal constraints have been placed in 
EU primary law to prevent the ECJ and the national courts from 
developing a substantive CFR-based review of Member States’ 
restrictive abortion laws.  Yet, as I have argued, from a normative 
point of view, a CFR-based review of Member States’ abortion laws 
may be the only satisfactory solution to the discrimination resulting 
from a regime in which resourceful women are able to escape 
domestic abortion bans by travelling abroad, and poor women are not.  
Whether the CFR will play the same constitutionalizing role in the EU 
multilevel architecture that the Bill of Rights has played in the U.S. 
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federal system is a tantalizing question that only the future will 
answer. 
 
